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Codification of the Economic Substance 
Doctrine:  Substantive Impact and 
Unintended Consequences  
 
Rebecca Rosenberg1 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The 2010 enactment of Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
19862 imported the judicially-created economic substance doctrine into the 
Internal Revenue Code.  In other words, it “codified” the doctrine.  Economic 
substance is a long-standing judicial creation, recognized in many court 
decisions.3  Under case law, the economic substance doctrine essentially 
provides that a tax benefit can be denied if it is not “the thing which the 
statute intended,”4 even if the transaction meets all of the statutory and 
regulatory requirements for claiming the tax benefit.   
Section 7701(o) provides rules that change the substantive content of the 
economic substance doctrine.5  These modifications apply only where the 
economic substance doctrine is already applicable to the transaction 
(“relevant,” in the statute’s terminology), which is a determination that 
Congress leaves to the courts.6  Section 7701(o) provides that such a 
transaction meets the economic substance test only if the transaction satisfies 
 
 1.  Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law.  The author 
would like to thank her excellent research assistants: Madeleine Burnette-McGrath, Sarah DuFresne, and 
Jarod Rose. 
 2.  I.R.C. § 7701(o).  Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (the “Code”) and the associated Treasury regulations.  The full text of section 7701(o) 
appears in the Appendix, for convenience. 
 3.  See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 1997 WL 93314, at *36 (1997), 
aff’d 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (ACM); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 
2015) (BNY Mellon II), cert. denied 136 S.Ct. 1377 (2016). 
 4.  See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); see also, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 
at 113 (citing the quoted language from Gregory as showing that the doctrine is aimed at discerning 
whether a claimed tax benefit is consistent with congressional intent). 
 5.  See generally I.R.C. § 7701(o).  
 6.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1), (o)(5)(C). 
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both an objective economic effect test and a subjective business purpose 
test.7  It also states that profit potential may be used to meet these two tests 
only if the reasonably expected profit is at least “substantial” in relation to 
expected net tax benefits.8  It further requires the Department of the Treasury 
(the “Treasury”) to issue guidance to determine whether foreign taxes are 
treated as a cost in computing pre-tax profit for these purposes9 (an issue on 
which the circuits are currently divided).10 
Section 7701(o) appears to require new emphasis on the subjective 
prong, by implying that the subjective analysis must require something 
different than the objective test.11  Many courts have used an analysis based 
on profit (or on change in economic circumstances) to determine whether a 
taxpayer had a subjective business purpose (especially for corporate 
taxpayers), so that the objective and subjective prongs have had significant 
(sometimes total) overlap in the past.12  In addition, the objective prong has 
often been weighted more heavily than subjective intent, no matter how the 
courts described the relationship between the two prongs.13  Section 7701(o) 
 
 7.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
 8.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 9.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 10.  See infra note 242. 
 11.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1); see also infra Part III B. 
 12.  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 260 (3d Cir. 1998); Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 988 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (referring to the objective and subjective analyses as “related factors”); see also infra note 
205.  But see Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99111, at *75–76 (D. MN. July 
22, 2014) (“One possible construction is that any transaction that passes the economic substance test 
(based upon reasonable profit expectations) is by definition motivated by a business purpose.  In that 
event, the subjective test would only become relevant if there was no economic substance.  If that analysis 
is appropriate, however, it would be reasonable to expect clear authority to that effect”).   
For example, two federal circuit courts held that loans met the economic substance doctrine’s 
requirements even though the loans’ sole business purpose was the same access to funds that allowed 
them to meet the objective prong.  See BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir. 2015) (not discussing 
subjective purpose of the loan beyond stating that “Under both the objective and subjective prongs of the 
economic substance doctrine, the loan was no sham: It constituted $1.5 billion in cash that was available 
for BNY to utilize in any way it saw fit throughout the duration of STARS.”); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United 
States, 786 F.3d 932, 955–98 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Salem II].    
 13.  See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S., 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1146 (D. MN. 2017) [hereinafter 
Wells Fargo II] (“although some courts have said that the lack of a business purpose can by itself 
invalidate a transaction, the actual results indicate either that this language was dicta (as in ASA 
Investerings) or that the taxpayer’s subjective motives became less important when the transaction had 
substantial objective economic substance (as in United Parcel Service) . . . there is a gap between what 
courts say and what courts do: Although courts may say that a subjective non-tax business purpose is 
essential, courts in fact have been reluctant to disregard economically substantive transactions solely on 
the basis of the taxpayer’s subjective motives.”) (emphasis in original); Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. 
United States, 844 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2016) (Santander) (“This court has been particularly wary of 
inquiring into the subjective motivations of taxpayers: ‘[U]nless Congress makes it abundantly clear, we 
do not think tax consequences should be dependent upon the discovery of a purpose, or a state of mind, 
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appears to require much of that to change, but that effect may have been 
inadvertent.  Among other things, this raises questions as to the relative 
weight of statutory language and contradictory legislative intent, as 
expressed in the legislative history.14 
Section 7701(o) also leaves some requirements, such as “meaningful” 
change in “economic position” and “substantial” business purpose, to be 
interpreted by the courts or through Treasury regulations.15  Until such 
interpretations are provided, the plain meanings of “meaningful” and 
“substantial” appear to impose more stringent conditions than pre-
codification case law (at least in some circuits). 
Formerly a purely judicial doctrine,16 the economic substance doctrine 
is now a mix of legislative requirements (like the profit-to-tax-benefit ratio 
 
whether it be elaborate or simple.’”) (citation omitted), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 2295 (2017); ACM P’ship 
v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) (“ACM’s possession of the LIBOR notes, although not 
intended to serve non-tax purposes, had significant non-tax economic effects, consisting of several 
million dollars in actual economic losses.  As we acknowledged in Wexler, even where a transaction is 
not intended to serve business purposes, it may give rise to a deduction to the extent that it has objective 
economic consequences apart from tax benefits.”) (citations omitted), see also id. at 248 n.31 (“Where a 
transaction objectively affects the taxpayer’s net economic position, legal relations, or non-tax business 
interests, it will not be disregarded merely because it was motivated by tax considerations.”); Sheldon v. 
Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 769 (1990); Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 994 (1987) [hereinafter Cherin] (“We 
have never held that the mere presence of an individual’s profit objective will require us to recognize for 
tax purposes a transaction which lacks economic substance.”), id. at 996; Pacheco v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 
1989-296, 1989 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 308, *16–17 (“In deciding whether a transaction is devoid of 
economic substance, the taxpayer's subjective statement as to his profit motive in entering into a 
transaction is relevant, but we place greater emphasis on objective facts demonstrating a realistic potential 
for profit.”); Gampp v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1991-548, 1991 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 596, *33 (same); see 
also Yosha v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A transaction has economic substance when 
it is the kind of transaction that some people enter into without a tax motive, even though the people 
fighting to defend the tax advantages of the transaction might not or would not have undertaken it but for 
the prospect of such advantages—may indeed have had no other interest in the transaction.”); but cf.  IRS 
v. Cm Holdings (in Re Cm Holdings, Inc.), 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although our Court has 
hinted that the objective analysis may be more important than the subjective, the latter analysis remains 
important.”) (citation omitted); id. at 105–106 (rejecting taxpayer’s argument that subjective motives 
cannot be considered by the courts in an economic substance analysis). 
 14.  See generally Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 549, 576 (Ct. Cl. 
2015) (when the plain language of a statute is clear, it is generally unnecessary to consult the legislative 
history, but “[t]he Supreme Court has noted, however, that when it appears that the plain language of a 
statute resolves the issue, a court is to ‘look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is 
[a] “clearly expressed legislative intention” contrary to that language, which would require us to question 
the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.’”)  (quoting 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (alteration  in the original, further citations 
omitted)), aff’d 797 F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g den’d 805 F.3d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. den’d 
136 S. Ct. 1659 (2016). 
 15.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o). 
 16.  The previous exclusive power of the judicial branch over the economic substance doctrine 
raises bigger-picture issues about the appropriateness of judicial doctrines that override the literal 
language of statutes and regulations.  Such doctrines can create concerns about predictability, because the 
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test),17 areas in which the Treasury has the newly acquired power to issue 
regulations, and areas left to the courts (such as the question of whether the 
doctrine applies to a particular transaction,18 and any other issue that isn’t 
preempted by the statute or by agency guidance).  
One of the biggest changes caused by Section 7701(o) is the executive 
branch’s ability to alter the economic substance doctrine by the exercise of 
regulatory authority.19  This raises issues regarding the extent of such 
regulatory authority, and the Treasury’s willingness to issue such guidance, 
especially given that there has been no guidance on the treatment of foreign 
taxes as costs, and little meaningful guidance on any other aspect of 
7701(o).20 
 
 
 
 
 
results can vary based on the facts and circumstances and because such doctrines can evolve over time.  
See generally Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW 807, 809 (1995); Mark 
P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 255, 255 (2002); Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 (1992); Martin J. 
McMahon, Jr., Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to Interpret the Internal Revenue Code, 
54 SMU L. REV. 195, 206 (2001); see also Daniel M. Schneider, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Federal 
Tax Cases Decided by Trial Courts, 1993–2006: A Quantitative Assessment, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 35, 50 
(2009).  Some commentators have criticized the economic substance doctrine, arguing that it is too vague, 
unpredictable, or subjective (on the part of the IRS or the courts), and that its role could be better filled 
by another approach.  See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
389, 392 (2010); Allen D. Madison, Rationalizing Tax Law by Breaking the Addiction to Economic 
Substance, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 441, 476 (2011); see also Am. Bar Ass’n Sec. of Tax’n, Letter to the 
Treasury, reprinted at Economic Substance Codification: ABA Has “Substantial Reservations”, 115 TAX 
NOTES 389, 391 (2007) (expressing concerns about an earlier proposal for codification); Steven A. Bank, 
Codifying Judicial Doctrines: No Cure for Rules But More Rules?, 54 SMU L. REV. 37, 41 (2001) 
(discussing earlier codification proposals).  The economic substance doctrine’s judicial roots can also 
lead to issues regarding the appropriate interaction between the three branches of government.  On the 
one hand, the doctrine allows judges to disregard literal compliance with a statute but, on the other hand, 
the entire point of the doctrine is to implement congressional intent (not to determine what the judiciary 
thinks is the best policy result, but to carry out the result that Congress intended). 
 17.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 18.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C).  
 19.  See generally I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 20.  The IRS has issued two notices on section 7701(o).  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 
411; I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746.  It has also written two letters of instructions to its own 
employees regarding the assertion of the post-codification economic substance doctrine.  Heather C. 
Maloy, Large Bus. & Int’l Div., IRS, LB&I-4-0711015, Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the 
Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties (2011) [hereinafter LB&I Directive]; 
Heather C. Maloy, Large and Mid-Sized Business Division, IRS, LMSB-20-0910-024, Codification of 
the Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties (Directive for Industry Directors; Director, Field 
Specialists; Director, Pre-Filing and Technical Guidance; Director, International Compliance, Strategy, 
and Policy) [hereinafter LMSB directive]. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRE-CODIFICATION ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE 
DOCTRINE 
The economic substance doctrine is a judicial doctrine that essentially 
provides that tax benefits can be denied if such benefits are not “the thing 
which the statute intended,”21 even if the taxpayer meets the specific 
requirements of the Code and regulations. If a transaction lacks economic 
substance, the entire transaction is disregarded for federal income tax 
purposes.22  The transaction thus generates no federal income tax benefits 
(but also creates no taxable income, and no other federal income tax effects 
of any kind).23   
 
 21.  See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); see also, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 
104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 22.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d at 108; Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 
779 (5th Cir. 2001); Alessandra v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1995-238, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2768, 1995 Tax Ct. 
Memo LEXIS 240, *10–11 (1995); Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d. Cir. 1991) (“If a transaction 
is devoid of economic substance—as the transactions involved here undeniably were—, it simply is not 
recognized for federal taxation purposes, for better or for worse.”); ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 261–62 (3d Cir. 
1998) (the entire transaction, and all its federal tax consequences, are disregarded, with an exception for 
separable parts with economic substance); Glass v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087, 1175–76 (1986) (“It follows, 
of course, that since the straddle transactions were a sham, gains reported by petitioners in year two and 
thereafter do not constitute taxable income to them”); IRS v. Cm Holdings (in Re Cm Holdings, Inc.), 
301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002).   
There is an exception for the federal income tax effects of a separable part of a bigger transaction, 
if such separable part itself has economic substance.  See, e.g., Alessandra v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1995-
238, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2768, 1995 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 240, *14-15, *18-19 (1995); Wells Fargo II, 
260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1146-47 (D. MN 2017); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-
225, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 367, 2013 WL 5311057 at *4 (2013), aff’d 801 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2015); ACM, 
157 F.3d at 262.   
Taxpayers recently challenged the idea that all federal income tax effects of an economic sham 
are disregarded (at least for deductions of foreign taxes), without success.  See Wells Fargo & Co. v. 
United States, Civ. No. 09-cv-02764-PJS-TNL (D. MN Oct. 24, 2017) (taxpayer motion for summary 
judgement arguing that, among other things, foreign taxes that were not creditable by reason of economic 
sham treatment could nonetheless be deducted); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States; No. 0:09-cv-02764 
(order issued Sept. 15, 2017) (D. MN 2017); Santander Holdings USA, Inc., & Subsidiaries v. U.S., No. 
1:09-cv-11043 (D. MA. July 17, 2018) (“A transaction’s lack of economic substance is broadly fatal to 
tax benefits that arise only because of the condemned contrivance”). 
 23.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d at 108; Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 
779 (5th Cir. 2001); Alessandra v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2768 (1995).  
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The economic substance doctrine has a long history, expressed in 
voluminous case law.24  It prevents taxpayers from claiming tax benefits that 
the courts see as frustrating congressional intent,25 essentially where such 
benefits are viewed as meeting the language but not the spirit of the 
applicable Code and regulatory rules.26   
Various Federal circuits use different tests to implement their analysis of 
whether a claimed tax benefit is within congressional intent and thus has 
sufficient economic substance.27  Almost all circuits include an examination 
of objective profit potential or change in economic position (often called the 
objective prong or objective test) and also an analysis of whether the 
taxpayer’s subjective motives included sufficient non-tax purposes (often 
called the subjective prong or business purpose test).28   
Some circuits require that a transaction must meet both the objective and 
subjective prongs in order to have economic substance (the conjunctive 
test).29  Other circuits state that a transaction that meets either the objective 
or the subjective prong has sufficient economic substance (the disjunctive 
test).30  Still others explain that they do not apply a rigid two-prong test, but 
instead use a more flexible approach that includes examination of both 
objective profit potential and subjective purpose (hereinafter the flexible test, 
although it does not have a consistent label in the case law).31  Other 
variations are also possible.  For example, the First Circuit has stated that it 
 
 24.  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d 231; BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104. 
 25.  See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 1997 WL 93314, at *36 (1997) 
(the doctrine addresses “tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of transactions that serve no 
economic purpose other than tax savings”), aff’d 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).  That description of the 
economic substance doctrine from ACM Partnership was cited as the then-present law by the House 
Report that accompanied section 7701(o).  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 292, 292 n.107, as reprinted in 
2010 U.S.C.A.N.N., 123, 224 & n.107 (2010).  See also, e.g., Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1237 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Horn] (“the sham transaction doctrine seeks to identify a certain type of 
transaction that Congress presumptively would not have intended to accord beneficial tax treatment”). 
 26.  See generally H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 292–93; Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance 
Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 12 (2000). 
 27.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 293 (describing the differing approaches taken by various 
circuits); Amanda L. Yoder, Note, One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs: A Look into the Economic 
Substance Doctrine, 75 MO. L. REV. 1409, 1419–24 (2010); Erik M. Jensen, Legislative and Regulatory 
Responses to Tax Avoidance:  Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives, 57 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1 (2012) 
[hereinafter, Jensen, Responses]. 
 28.  See infra note 33, supra note 12. 
 29.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2015); Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 
893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 30.  See, e.g., Horn, 968 F.2d at 1234–35; Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 31.  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 987 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
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prefers to examine only objective factors, and that it would rather avoid 
inquiry into the taxpayer’s subjective motive.32  But regardless of how each 
circuit describes its formulation of the economic substance test, almost all 
courts nonetheless examine both the objective and subjective factors 
described above, even in disjunctive-test circuits.33    
Almost always, a circuit’s particular framing of the economic substance 
test (conjunctive, disjunctive, flexible, or other) made no difference to the 
result of an economic substance case, because most courts reached the same 
answer for both the objective and subjective prongs (i.e., the court found that 
both prongs were met or that both were failed).34  Therefore, the same 
ultimate finding on economic substance would have been reached (in most 
cases) regardless of whether the court required the taxpayer to meet one 
prong or both. 
One recent, unusual exception to this pattern is the Wells Fargo case 
(including a jury verdict and a District Court decision).35  The jury found that 
a loan had sufficient profit potential but lacked business purpose.36  (This 
was a rare holding, because profit potential is often used to prove business 
purpose).  The district judge in Wells Fargo subsequently held (applying a 
flexible approach) that the loan met the economic substance test and that the 
interest deductions relating to the loan were therefore allowable.37  In another 
case, the Tax Court found that a transaction failed the objective prong, and 
declined to reach a finding on the subjective prong.38  However, the court 
 
 32.  See Santander, 844 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 33.  See, e.g., Santander, 844 F.3d 15, 22, 24–26 (discussing subjective motives even though the 
opinion says that the circuit prefers to examine only objective aspects of the test); Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 
T.C. 986, 992, 994–96 (1987) (declining to reach a holding on the taxpayer’s subjective motives after 
finding that there was no reasonable possibility of profit, but discussing the taxpayer’s possible motives). 
 34.  See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 3d 827, 834 (D. Minn. 2015) 
[hereinafter Wells Fargo I] (stating that the Eighth Circuit has never had to choose a version of the 
economic substance test, because it has always decided both prongs favorably or both prongs 
unfavorably); IES, 253 F.3d at 353 (same); see also Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 99111, at *75–76 (D. MN. July 22, 2014) (“Neither party cites a case in which a court finds a 
business purpose, but no economic substance or economic substance, but no business purpose.”).   
 35.  See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017). 
 36.  See id.; see also Cara Salvatore, Jury Sides with Feds in Wells Fargo $76M Tax Credit Suit, 
LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2016) https://www.law360.com/articles/864145/jury-sides-with-feds-in-wells-fargo-
76m-tax-credit-suit [https://perma.cc/9G5E-VL4H]; Wesley Elmore, Jury Sides with Government in 
Wells Fargo STARS Case, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 18, 2016) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/ 
2016-11-21 [https://perma.cc/N6JM-LQQB].  In contrast, the same jury found that the related trust 
transaction failed both prongs of the economic substance test.  See id.; Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 1140 
at 1142.  
 37.  Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1146 (D. MN 2017); see also Salvatore, supra note 36; 
Elmore, supra note 36.  
 38.  Cherin v.Comm’r, 89 T.C. at 992, 994. 
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implied that the taxpayer (a businessman who switched from beauty parlors 
to investments in cattle) had sincere (but perhaps unwarranted) subjective 
profit motive.39  If that were the case, the taxpayer might have prevailed 
under a disjunctive test (if unreasonable belief is sufficient), in contrast to 
his actual loss under the Tax Court’s use of the conjunctive formulation—
i.e., these two variations of the test might have reached different ultimate 
results. 
Courts’ overwhelming tendency to reach the same result on both prongs 
in the past might have been caused largely by the fact that the objective and 
subjective prongs were often given overlapping and redundant definitions 
(especially in application) before the effective date of Section 7701(o).40  The 
objective prong usually emphasized whether there was a reasonable 
expectation of profit.41  That same reasonable expectation of profit was often 
the primary element of the subjective business purpose analysis, especially 
for corporate taxpayers.42   
 
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SECTION 7701(O) 
Section 7701(o) was enacted in 2010,43 and applies to transactions 
entered into on or after March 31, 2010.44  The provision is entitled 
“Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine.”45  It applies only if the 
economic substance doctrine is “relevant” to a transaction (i.e., only if the 
case presents the type of transaction or tax benefit to which the economic 
substance analysis can be applied, not a type that is exempt from such 
analysis), as determined by the courts.46  If the economic substance doctrine 
is relevant, then Section 7701(o) sets forth several rules for its application.47  
 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  See supra note 12.  Identical interpretations of the objective and subjective tests may no longer 
be possible after section 7701(o).  See discussion infra Part III B. 
 41.  See infra note 193.  The profit inquiry does not require that actual profit materialize, but instead 
focuses on a reasonable expectation of profit.  See, e.g., Estate of Thomas v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 412, 429 
(1985) (it was not reasonably foreseeable that subsequent popularity of desktop computers would lead to 
a loss on supercomputer investment).  The pre-codification version of the objective prong also considered 
economic effects other than profit, at least in some circuits.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 119 
(2d Cir. 2015).   
 42.  See infra note 205. 
 43.  It was enacted by Section 1409 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  I.R.C. § 7701(o). 
 46.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1), (o)(5)(C). 
 47.  I.R.C. § 7701(o). 
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First, the section requires that a transaction must satisfy both the objective 
and subjective prongs in order to meet the economic substance test.48  In 
other words, all circuits must now use the conjunctive test, rather than the 
disjunctive test.  (The flexible test may still be acceptable, as long as it 
requires that taxpayers meet both the objective and subjective prongs.  See 
further discussion below.)   
Under Section 7701(o), the objective prong requires that the challenged 
transaction (the transaction that generates the challenged tax benefit) must 
“change[] in a meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s economic position.”49  The 
subjective prong, under section 7701(o), requires that such transaction have 
“substantial [non-tax] purpose.”50  Under the statute, profit potential cannot 
be taken into account for purposes of either prong unless the present value 
of reasonably expected profit is “substantial” in relation to expected tax 
benefits.51  (This article refers to that requirement as the ratio test or profit 
ratio test.)52  The section also requires the Treasury to issue regulations to 
treat foreign taxes as expenses in computing pre-tax profit, “in appropriate 
cases.”53   
Each of these provisions, and the additional detail in the statute, is 
discussed further below. Among other impacts, Section 7701(o) gives the 
Treasury the ability to issue guidance on the economic substance doctrine54 
(except on the issue of relevance, which is reserved to the courts).55  Other 
than the regulatory mandate regarding the treatment of foreign taxes as an 
expense,56 the ability to issue such guidance derives from the Treasury’s 
general ability to issue guidance with respect to all Code provisions,57 rather 
than from any specific grant of regulatory authority contained in Section 
7701(o). 
Section 7701(o) has only limited application to individual taxpayers (as 
opposed to corporations): For individuals, it applies only to “transactions 
 
 48.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
 49.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
 50.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 51.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 52.  See id.   
 53.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 54.  See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (giving the Treasury the general authority to issue regulations to interpret 
Code provisions: “the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of 
this title. . . .”). 
 55.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 56.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 57.  See I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
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entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in 
for the production of income.”58  Other transactions of individuals are 
exempt from Section 7701(o), but not from the case law on economic 
substance.59  The result of an economic substance analysis for an individual 
under the Section-7701(o)-modified economic substance doctrine, even for 
“transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity 
engaged in for the production of income,” is not pre-determined.  Even such 
transactions might not necessarily show both a meaningful change in 
economic circumstances and also sufficient non-tax motive. 
The legislation that included Section 7701(o) also enacted amendments 
to several penalty provisions.60  Under those amendments, deficiencies 
attributable to the economic substance doctrine (as defined by section 
7701(o)) are subject to a 20-percent accuracy-related penalty.61  Such penalty 
increases to 40 percent if the taxpayer does not sufficiently disclose the facts 
regarding the relevant transaction’s claimed tax treatment.62  The same 
penalties apply to tax deficiencies arising from any “rule of law” that is 
“similar” to the economic substance doctrine (as so defined).63  “Reasonable 
cause” exceptions do not apply to such penalties imposed by reason of the 
economic substance doctrine or any “similar rule of law.”64  Thus, an opinion 
of counsel regarding the economic substance doctrine or similar rule of law 
does not protect against such penalties.65 
 
 58.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B).   
 59.  In practice, however, the economic substance doctrine may seldom apply to such non-business, 
non-production-of-income transactions, because there are relatively fewer tax benefits claimable with 
respect to such transactions.  Compare I.R.C. §§ 262 (personal expenses) and 183(b) (limited deduction 
for activities not engaged in for profit) with I.R.C. §§ 162 (trade or business expenses) and 212(1) 
(expenses “for the production or collection of income”).  
 60.  See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6), 6662(i); 6664(c)(2), 6664(d)(2); 6676(c); Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, §1409 (amending the Code to add both 
new section 7701(o) and the relevant changes to the penalty provisions). 
 61.  See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (applying section 6662(a)’s penalty to tax deficiencies attributable to 
the economic substance doctrine or similar “rule[s] of law”). 
 62.  I.R.C. § 6662(i) (regarding failure to adequately disclose on a tax return or an attached 
statement).  For a critique of the new penalty provisions, see generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The 
Case Against a Strict Liability Economic Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 445, 447–49, 465–70 
(2011) (discussing the penalty provisions). 
 63.  See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6). 
 64.  See id., I.R.C. §§ 6664(c)(2), 6664(d)(2).  See also I.R.C. § 6676(c) (preventing reasonable 
cause exception from applying to “excessive amounts” attributable to the economic substance doctrine 
(as described in section 7701(o)) or any similar doctrine).  
 65.  The Joint Committee on Taxation’s report on Section 7701(o) and associated provisions refers 
to the strict liability nature of the penalties for economic substance doctrine-related deficiencies as 
follows: 
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After Section 7701(o)’s effective date, the economic substance doctrine 
has become a mix of 1) statutory mandates, 2) areas in which the Treasury 
can issue guidance, and 3) areas that the courts can interpret.  The third set 
of issues includes any items that are not constrained by statutory language 
and on which the Treasury has not yet issued guidance, as well as the 
prerequisite question of whether the economic substance analysis can be 
applied to a particular transaction at all.66   
Section 7701(o) also imposes some degree of consistency—but not total 
uniformity—on the various circuits’ interpretations of the economic 
substance doctrine.67  For example, all circuits must apply the profit ratio 
test.  But although all circuits must address both prongs, different circuits 
could interpret “meaningful” economic change and “substantial” profit and 
business purpose differently.  The various circuits can also differ in their 
analyses of the other areas left undefined or unanswered by the statute (and 
by future agency guidance), as described below. 
No court has yet applied Section 7701(o).  Multiple recent economic 
substance cases have been litigated, but all of these cases concerned 
transactions that occurred before Section 7701(o)’s effective date.68  Given 
the time required to move a dispute through the litigation process, cases 
concerning Section 7701(o) may be arriving in the courts soon. 
 
III. IMPACT OF SECTION 7701(O)’S SUBSTANTIVE RULES ON 
THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 
 
 
No exceptions (including the reasonable cause rules) to the penalty are available. Thus, under 
the provision, outside opinions or in-house analysis would not protect a taxpayer from 
imposition of a penalty if it is determined that the transaction lacks economic substance or 
fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. 
Staff of the Jt. Comm. on Tax’n, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation 
Act of 2010,” as Amended, in Combination with the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” JCX-
18-10, at 156 (2010) [hereinafter Joint Committee Report]. 
 66.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 67.  Cf. Erik M. Jensen, Sometimes Unguided (or Maybe Misguided) Economic Substance 
Guidance, 32 J. TAX’N INV. 27, 28 (2015) [hereinafter Jensen, Unguided] (the conjunctive test 
“requirement might not require complete consistency among the circuits, but it is a step in the right 
direction”). 
 68.  See, e.g., Santander, 844 F.3d 15; BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2015); Wells Fargo 
II, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140; see generally Rebecca Rosenberg, STARS Wars: Application of the Economic 
Substance Doctrine to Foreign Tax Credits, and What the Future Holds, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 165 
(2017) [hereinafter Rosenberg, STARS Wars] (discussing the recent STARS cases, although these are not 
the only recent cases on economic substance). 
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A. 7701(o) Requires a Conjunctive Two-Prong Test 
 
1. Why Did Congress Bother Codifying the Two-Prong Conjunctive Test?  
Given that the choice of formulation (conjunctive, disjunctive, flexible, 
or other) of the economic substance test so seldom made a difference in the 
past (as far as the ultimate finding of whether a transaction was respected as 
having economic substance or not), one wonders why mandating conformity 
to the conjunctive test was important enough to require codification in 
Section 7701(o).69  There are two obvious potential reasons:  First, Section 
7701(o) scored as a “revenue raiser,” and second, Congress might have been 
concerned that different formulations of the economic substance doctrine 
could lead to different judicial results in the future, even though that seldom 
happened under existing case law.  Both rationales are discussed further 
below. 
First, Section 7701(o) was scored as a “revenue raiser”70 (i.e., it was 
estimated that section 7701(o)’s enactment would generate additional tax 
revenue), which would have made it more appealing to Congress.  Such 
revenue estimates are used to determine the aggregate impact of legislative 
proposals:  Revenue raisers and losers are netted to determine if a proposed 
legislative package has a positive, negative, or neutral budget impact, as a 
whole.71  Some commentators have speculated that Section 7701(o) was used 
to generate a net positive revenue estimate that would help pass the 
 
 69.  As discussed throughout this article, Section 7701(o) also includes other changes to the 
economic substance test, as compared to pre-codification case law.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(2)(A) 
(profit ratio test), 7701(o)(2)(B) (requiring regulations regarding the treatment of foreign taxes).  But such 
other changes do not appear to have been the main reason for codification and might have been 
accomplished without also requiring the conjunctive test. 
 70.  See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions 
Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal as Described by the Department of the 
Treasury, May 2009 (JCX-28-09), June 11, 2009; Jensen, Unguided, supra note 67, at 27 n.4 
(“[C]odification was scored as a revenue-raiser, a factor supporting the idea that enhancement [rather 
than codifying the doctrine exactly as it existed in the case law] was the goal.”); Richard M. Lipton, 
“Codification” of the Economic Substance Doctrine–Much Ado About Nothing, 112 J. TAX’N 324, 325 
(June 2010) (“Congress enacted Section 7701(o) in order to raise an estimated $4.5 billion of revenue.”); 
Monica D. Armstrong, OMG!  ESD Codified!: The Overreaction to Codification of the Economic 
Substance Doctrine, 9 FLA. A.&M. U. L. REV. 113, 116 n.14 (2013).   
 71.  See generally George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and 
Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 185–87 (2009) (describing the cost estimating process 
generally); Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 875–79 (2002) (describing budget estimates and revenue offsets generally); Rachelle 
Holmes Perkins, Breaking The Spell Of Tax Budget Magic, 6 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 6–12 (2014) 
(discussing budget estimates and revenue offsets generally). 
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Affordable Care Act.72  Even if that was a major motivation for enacting 
Section 7701(o), it leaves the question of why this section would be predicted 
to raise revenue, given that the results of the conjunctive test and other 
versions of the economic substance test were nearly identical, in almost all 
cases (and when many circuits had already adopted the conjunctive test).73  
In other words, imposing the conjunctive test does not, at first glance, appear 
to change many court case results.  It therefore does not appear to raise 
additional tax revenue by disallowing more tax benefits than the pre-
codification version of the doctrine.   
The reason for the positive revenue estimate regarding codification of 
the economic substance doctrine may have been the penalty provision 
amendments that accompanied Section 7701(o), rather than (or in addition 
to) codification itself.74  Such penalties’ effects may have been included with 
Section 7701(o)’s revenue estimate, even though they appear in other Code 
sections.75  Those penalty provisions provide for a 20-percent penalty for tax 
understatements attributable to economic substance issues, without an 
exception for reasonable cause.76  If the taxpayer fails to adequately disclose 
the facts regarding a transaction that lacks economic substance, the penalty 
percentage increases to 40 percent.77  The positive revenue estimate for 
Section 7701(o) may be almost entirely due to such penalties, rather than the 
requirement that all circuits use the conjunctive test.  Section 7701(o) itself 
may have been intended largely as a definitional section, describing the issue 
that triggers the 20- and 40-percent penalties.78  Although this explanation 
has some appeal, Congress could have accomplished this goal without 
 
 72.  See, e.g., Jensen, Unguided, supra note 67 at 27, n.4; cf. Lipton, supra note 70 at 325, 333.  See 
also supra note 70. 
 73.  It is possible that several circuits had no need to fully commit to one formulation or the other 
of the economic substance doctrine in the past, if they only faced transactions for which all formulations 
led to the same result.  For example, IES and Wells Fargo say this is the case for the Eighth Circuit, see 
IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 353-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 
3d at 1146. 
 74.  See supra note 70. 
 75.  See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6) (20-percent penalty), 6662(i) (40-percent penalty in the absence of 
adequate disclosure), 6662(c), 6664(d)(2), 6676(c) (inapplicability of reasonable cause exceptions). 
 76.  See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(6) (20-percent penalty). 
 77.  See I.R.C. § 6662(i) (40-percent penalty in the absence of adequate disclosure). 
 78.  That would be consistent with Section 7701’s general function as a section that holds a wide 
range of definitions, such as the definitions of “corporation,” “domestic,” and “shareholder.”  See I.R.C. 
§ 7701.  For an example of a substantive code provision that serves largely as a cross-reference or 
touchpoint for another rule, see I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(H)(i), which essentially repeats a rule already stated 
in the pre-existing regulations (found in Treasury Regulation §1.904-6(a)(1)(iv)).  Section 
904(d)(2)(H)(i)’s real function appears to be setting forth the general rule so that an exception (not found 
in the regulations) can be provided in Section 904(d)(2)(H)(ii). 
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mandating the conjunctive test, by merely providing a broader definition 
(including multiple versions of the economic substance test) that the penalty 
provisions could cross-reference as a description of the economic substance 
doctrine.79 
There is an alternative (or additional) explanation for why Congress may 
have felt the need to require the conjunctive test:  Congress may have 
anticipated more disparity between the results of the various economic 
substance formulations in the future, even if such differences had seldom 
occurred before.  Congress may have proven prescient in this respect:  There 
is a recent instance in which a jury held that a taxpayer’s transaction (a loan) 
met the objective prong because it had profit potential, but failed the business 
purpose prong because it lacked sufficient non-tax motives.80  The jury was 
examining a loan that was connected to a STARS81 transaction.82  The 
taxpayer allegedly borrowed at a higher interest rate than it could have found 
elsewhere, in order to make another transaction with the same counterparty 
look more like a real business transaction (in anticipation of an economic 
substance challenge to such other transaction).83  But although the taxpayer’s 
interest costs were higher than market rate, it may have used the loan 
proceeds to generate a profit, giving it a potential argument under the 
objective prong.84   
After the jury verdict, the relevant District Court requested briefs on how 
such a result should be treated,85 which was essentially a question of whether 
the Eighth Circuit (in that case) applied the conjunctive, disjunctive, or 
 
 79.  If the positive budget estimate does not stem from the penalty provisions, that would imply 
that congressional budget estimators thought that the substantive provisions of Section 7701(o) would 
increase tax collection by disallowing more tax benefits than pre-7701(o) versions of the economic 
substance doctrine.  For the reasons explained above, such a result seems unlikely to flow from the 
imposition of the conjunctive test (unless from the potential strengthening effect on the subjective prong, 
which Congress does not necessarily seem to have intended).  However, increased revenue collection 
might potentially follow from other substantive provisions of Section 7701(o), such as the rule that 
reasonably expected profit can only be taken into account if it is substantial in relation to expected net 
tax benefits.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 80.  See Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1143 (D. MN 2017); Salvatore, supra note 36.   
 81.  STARS is an abbreviation for Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities.  See, e.g., 
Salem Fin. Inc. v. U.S., 786 F.3d 932, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 82.  See Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. 
 83.  Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146-47. 
 84.  The Wells Fargo opinions do not provide details about the specific returns earned from the 
loan proceeds, but one opinion states that “Wells Fargo argues, it had a reasonable expectation of pretax 
profit because Wells Fargo’s anticipated (and actual) return on capital in the ordinary course of its banking 
operations during the five-year period of the loan exceeded 5.8 percent.”  Wells Fargo I, 143 F. Supp. 3d 
at 842; see also id. at 844; Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146–47.  
 85.  See id. at 1143; Salvatore, supra note 36.  
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flexible test before Section 7701(o)’s effective date.  Because the jury found 
that the loan met the objective but not the subjective prong, the taxpayer 
would win under the disjunctive test, but lose under the conjunctive test.86  
The result under the flexible test was harder to predict.  This is a rare example 
of a case in which the results of the objective and subjective prongs differed, 
so that the choice of approach (conjunctive, disjunctive, or other) made a 
difference to the ultimate question of whether the transaction met the 
economic substance test.  Ultimately, the trial court predicted that the Eighth 
Circuit would apply the flexible approach.87  Under that approach, the trial 
court held that the loan had sufficient substance to be respected.88 
Cherin is another unusual example of a case where the use of the 
conjunctive rather than disjunctive test may have made a difference.89  The 
taxpayer in that case invested in cattle, and the court found that there was no 
reasonable possibility of profit because of the cattle’s poor quality, the 
ineffective management of the cattle, and similar factors.90  The court then 
declined to take the taxpayer’s subjective motivation into account, holding 
that lack of profit potential was sufficient (on its own) to show a lack of 
economic substance.91  This was an application of the conjunctive test, which 
requires that the taxpayer meet both the objective and subjective prongs.92  
However, the court implied that the taxpayer may have sincerely (but 
mistakenly) expected a profit, i.e., that he was motivated by a desire for profit 
rather than by tax benefits.93  If the court had examined the taxpayer’s 
subjective intent in order to reach a holding on the subjective prong, and if it 
had applied the disjunctive test, the economic substance holding might have 
been different. 
It is interesting to consider what other kinds of transactions could cause 
the two prongs to yield different results from each other:  When will a 
 
 86.  See id.  The jury found that the trust transaction with the same counterparty failed both prongs 
of the economic substance test, and therefore lacked economic substance.  See Wells Fargo II, 260 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1142.  
 87.  See Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1144–45. 
 88.  See id. at 1143, 1146–47. 
 89.  See Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 989–91 (1987). 
 90.  Id. at 994. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  See generally id. at 993–94. 
 93.  At one point, the court even said that it was predictable that the taxpayer would stop paying 
the cattle managers once the taxpayer realized that expected profits were not materializing.  See id. at 
995–996.  Because the court thought it unnecessary to reach a holding on business purpose after the 
taxpayer failed the objective prong, the entire discussion of the taxpayer’s subjective intent is likely dicta 
(but interesting).  See id. 
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taxpayer have subjective business purpose but not reasonable expectation of 
profit (or change in economic circumstances), or vice versa?  Such a 
difference is the only fact pattern in which the ultimate result (the 
determination of whether the transaction has economic substance or not) of 
the conjunctive test differs from that of the disjunctive test or other economic 
substance formulations. 
Different results for the objective and subjective prongs might occur, for 
example, when individuals have honest but unreasonable expectations of 
profit (so that they might have business purpose94 but lack objectively 
reasonable profit potential or other change in economic position).95  Cherin 
could be one instance of this phenomena (depending on the detailed facts 
that showed subjective intent).96  Or one could imagine circumstances in 
which a taxpayer’s intent is almost entirely focused on tax benefits, but the 
transaction also is reasonably expected to create profit97 that is at least 
substantial in relation to such tax benefits (within the meaning of the profit 
ratio test).98  This might be especially possible if the profit is much smaller 
than the expected tax benefits, even if it meets the “substantial” requirement 
of the ratio test.  For example, profit that is one-fourth the amount of 
expected tax benefits might still be sufficiently “substantial,” but the 
taxpayer’s intent might be focused almost entirely on the tax benefits.    
There are other situations in which a transaction might pass the objective 
test (based on reasonably expected profit, even if the transaction is less 
profitable than the alternatives), but fail the business purpose test, depending 
on how the post-codification economic substance doctrine further develops 
in the future.  For example, in some instances, a taxpayer may have a choice 
between more and less profitable alternatives (like the higher-than-market-
rate-interest loan in Wells Fargo,99 a contract with higher transaction costs 
than the alternatives, or a rental property with lower returns than other 
options).  If the taxpayer chooses a less profitable alternative in order to 
maximize tax benefits, does that make it harder to pass the business purpose 
 
 94.  See infra Part III C (discussing whether business purpose must be reasonable).   
 95.  As discussed above, Section 7701(o) has limited application to individuals, but it does apply 
to individuals’ “transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in 
for the production of income.”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(B).  Of course, transactions of individuals that are not 
described in the preceding phrase may still be subject to pre-Section-7701(o) versions of the economic 
substance test.   
 96.  See Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. at 996.  
 97.  See, e.g., Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1143, 1146. 
 98.  See I.R.C. §7701(o)(2)(A). 
 99.  See Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. 
DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  10:28 AM 
Winter 2019              CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 71 
 
 
test, even if the transaction meets the objective prong?  (This question has 
occasionally been discussed by the courts,100 but has not been definitively 
answered by the case law or by Section 7701(o).)  The answers to these 
questions of interpretation affect the likelihood that a court’s finding on the 
objective profit prong might differ from its finding on the business purpose 
prong.   
Lastly, it is not clear why Congress chose the conjunctive test rather 
than, for example, requiring that the objective prong must be met in order for 
a transaction to have economic substance, and letting each circuit decide 
whether business purpose must also be proven.101  (This would not be 
synonymous with the disjunctive test, which would accept either the 
objective or subjective prong as sufficient, so that the objective prong need 
not be met.)  Such an approach would have been more consistent with the 
manner in which the courts have actually applied the economic substance 
doctrine.102 
Overall, it is not clear that requiring uniformity among the circuits on the 
conjunctive test was a sufficient reason for codification, without the further 
detailed changes to the economic substance doctrine that are discussed below 
and without the impact of the penalty provisions associated with the codified 
doctrine. 
 
2. Substantive Impact (or Lack Thereof) of Requiring the Conjunctive 
Test 
 
a. In General 
Section 7701(o)’s requirement that all circuits use the new, codified 
version of the conjunctive test has several substantive impacts.  First, it gives 
the government an advantage, and taxpayers a disadvantage, in economic 
substance cases in circuits that formerly used the disjunctive test (or in 
circuits that did not - in practice - require taxpayers to meet the business 
 
 100.  See, e.g., Salem Fin. Inc v. U.S., 112 Fed. Cl. 587-88 (finding that a loan had no economic 
substance), Salem Fin. Inc. v. U.S., 786 F.3d 932, 950, 956–58 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing on treatment 
of the loan); Pritired 1, LLC v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 739–40 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2011) 
(Pritired) (appearing troubled by the fact that, at least for some portions of the challenged transaction, 
the taxpayer chose a less profitable investment in order to generate foreign tax credits: “[I]t exchanged a 
positive cash flow (based on LIBOR plus 1%) for a lower cash flow,” and “the Pritired transaction would 
have a cash return and IRR lower than an otherwise comparable investment in a general obligation 
municipal bond”). 
 101.  See, e.g., the approach of the First Circuit in Santander.  Santander, 844 F.3d at 22–23 (1st 
Cir. 2016). 
 102.  See supra note 13. 
DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  10:28 AM 
72 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 15:1 
 
 
purpose prong if they met the objective test, no matter how the economic 
substance test was described).103  In theory, it must be harder for taxpayers 
to meet both the objective and subjective tests than just one or the other.104  
Thus, Section 7701(o) gives the government a better chance of disallowing 
a tax benefit, because now it only needs to win one of the two prongs (and 
taxpayers, conversely, must meet both) in every circuit.  
Second, the structure of Section 7701(o)’s conjunctive test implies that 
the objective and subjective prongs must differ from each other.  Third, the 
objective and subjective prongs are now required to be equal to each other.  
In pre-Section-7701(o) case law, in contrast, failing the subjective test was 
almost never enough (on its own) to cause a transaction to fail the economic 
substance analysis.105  Instead, no matter what version of the economic 
substance test was applied, the objective prong was generally given more 
emphasis than the subjective prong.106  Lastly, taxpayers may argue that the 
statute’s description of the conjunctive test prevents courts from considering 
any other factors (such as congressional intent) in addition to the objective 
and subjective prongs.  The latter three arguments may affect even those 
circuits that already used the conjunctive test before Section 7701(o)’s 
enactment.  The impact on the business purpose prong is described in Part 
III C below.  The possible argument that the objective and subjective prongs 
are now the only content of the economic substance test is discussed 
immediately below. 
 
b. Does Not Prevent Use of Additional Requirements or Factors 
There is a question as to whether Section 7701(o), by its phrasing and its 
requirement of the two-prong test, precludes courts’ consideration (as part of 
the economic substance test) of anything else in addition to the two prongs.  
The statute provides that “In the case of any transaction to which the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as 
having economic substance only if [it meets the objective and subjective 
 
 103.  See id.  This article argues that there was not much difference, in practice, between the 
conjunctive test and other versions of the economic substance test before Section 7701(o).  However, 
there is clearly a difference between the post-codification version of the doctrine under Section 7701(o) 
and the pre-codification version of the conjunctive, disjunctive, or flexible formulations. 
 104.  Section 7701(o) also implies that the two prongs must be different from each other, so that the 
taxpayer is not merely required to meet two identical prongs.  See further discussion infra Parts III B & 
C.  
 105.  See supra note 13; cf. supra note 12.   
 106.  See supra note 13. 
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prongs.]”107  Although the words “only if” mean that both prongs are 
required, the “only if” phrasing does not technically prevent courts from 
examining or requiring other factors as well.108  The statute does not say “if 
and only if,” or use other language that mandates that the two prongs are 
necessarily always sufficient in themselves, or are the only factors.109 
If the courts or the IRS choose to require more than the objective and 
subjective prongs in order to meet the economic substance test, such a 
requirement appears to be permitted under the statutory language and is 
generally taxpayer-unfavorable.  In contrast, the courts and the IRS cannot 
find that a transaction has sufficient economic substance unless the taxpayer 
meets at least the objective and subjective prongs listed in the statute.  After 
Section 7701(o), the objective and subjective prongs are a minimum, but not 
necessarily the entirety of the test, for finding that a transaction is respected 
under the economic substance doctrine.   
Taxpayers are unlikely to argue for any additional requirements for 
meeting the economic substance test, but a court or the government might 
(in theory) suggest that more factors should also be taken into account, and 
that such added factors could preclude a transaction from having economic 
substance even if it meets the objective and subjective prongs.  Such an 
approach could be consistent with the flexible version of the test previously 
applied by some circuits.  Cases like ACM contemplated taking into account 
 
 107.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (emphasis added). 
 108.  See Jensen, Unguided, supra note 67, at 27 n.11 (2015) (reaching the same conclusion: “The 
statute seems to set only a minimum standard—economic substance does not exist unless both the 
objective and subjective tests are satisfied.  A court therefore could, consistent with that minimum 
standard, presumably determine that other requirements must be satisfied for a transaction to have 
economic substance.”); see also Jensen, Responses, supra note 27, at 32 n.156 (2012) (citing a 
commentator as pointing out that Section 7701(o) technically “does not codify the [economic substance 
doctrine] but rather codifies a precondition to taxpayer's escaping the [doctrine],” and agreeing with that 
characterization) (quoting Henry Stow Lovejoy et al., Foreign Tax Credits, Economic Substance and the 
Future, ABA Sec. of Tax’n, Comm. on Banking and Savings Inst. (Feb. 17, 2012)). 
 109.  A Large Business and International Division (LB&I) directive, issued after section 7701(o)’s 
enactment, lists not two but eighteen factors for examiners to consider in analyzing whether the economic 
substance doctrine should be asserted.  See LB&I Directive, supra note 20.  The eighteen factors relate 
to whether the economic substance doctrine should be raised as an issue on audit.  This resembles (but is 
narrower than) the preliminary question of whether the economic substance doctrine applies at all 
(“relevance,” in the statute’s terminology), and does not address the result of an economic substance 
analysis after the doctrine is determined to be applicable.  In other words, the eighteen factors are not the 
test for whether the economic substance doctrine is met, but only factors for considering whether IRS 
employees should raise it as an issue.  See generally Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic 
Substance Doctrine: Agency Response and Certain Other Unforeseen Consequences, 10 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Codification] (discussing the IRS directive).   
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all of the facts and circumstances, as part of the economic substance test.110  
Technically, considering all of the facts and circumstances is still allowed 
(and can affect whether a transaction is respected as having economic 
substance), as long as the objective and subjective prongs are also both 
required.   
One factor that courts might want to consider, in addition to the two 
prongs, is the legislative intent regarding the particular statute that creates 
the challenged tax benefit (e.g., the congressional intent relating to foreign 
tax credits versus interest deductions versus other benefits).111  
Congressional intent is the touchstone of the economic substance doctrine, 
according to many descriptions of the doctrine.112  For example, the doctrine 
 
 110.  See ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 246–47 (3d Cir. 1998) 246–47; see also generally Jerald David 
August, The Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, Part I, 12 BUS. ENTITIES 4, 21 (2010) 
(describing the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ formulation of the 
economic substance doctrine as an “all factors” method). 
 111.  Congressional intent is already part of the relevance inquiry, i.e., the question of whether the 
economic substance doctrine applies to that type of tax benefit at all.  See, e.g., Gardner v. Comm'r, 954 
F.2d 836, 838–39 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 54–56 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  But the relevance determination is not 
necessarily the end of the examination of congressional intent: Relevance is just the preliminary question 
of whether the rest of the economic substance analysis can proceed.  The discussion in the text above 
suggests that courts could, in theory, take congressional intent into account not only as part of the 
preliminary relevance inquiry, but also (a second time), as part of the determination of whether the 
transaction meets or fails the economic substance test once that test is applied.  Intent could also 
conceivably be considered as a means of interpreting the objective and subjective prongs (e.g., what kind 
of profit did Congress expect from transactions that generate interest deductions) in addition to being 
applied as a separate inquiry apart from the two prongs (as the Santander court used it).  See Santander, 
844 F.3d 15, 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[W]e conclude both that the STARS Trust transaction had no 
objective non-tax economic benefit and that Congress, in creating the foreign tax credit regime, did not 
intend that it would cover this type of generated transaction.”). 
 112.  See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease 
the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether to avoid them, by means which the law 
permits, cannot be doubted.  But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the 
tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.”) (emphasis added); Knetsch v. United States, 364 
U.S. 361, 367 (1960) (focusing on congressional intent, “[w]e, therefore, look to the statute and materials 
relevant to its construction for evidence that Congress meant in § 264(a)(2) to authorize the deduction . . 
. .”) (emphasis added); cf. Santander, 844 F.3d at 22 (stating that the economic substance doctrine stems 
from Gregory and quoting the Supreme Court as saying that “the transaction upon its face lies outside the 
plain intent of the statute” (quoting Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470)).   
Implementing congressional intent may also be the theoretical reason why courts are allowed to use 
the economic substance doctrine to disregard a taxpayer’s literal compliance with statutory and regulatory 
rules, because doctrines of statutory interpretation may allow courts to ignore the literal language of a 
statute if the literal meaning is manifestly contrary to the intent of Congress (or if such meaning makes 
no sense).  See, e.g., Santander, 844 F.3d at 21 (“The economic substance doctrine, like other common 
law tax doctrines, can thus perhaps best be thought of as a tool of statutory interpretation”); Gardner v. 
Comm'r, 954 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam), (citing statutory construction rules against 
finding absurd results, in support of court’s finding that losses could be disregarded as lacking economic 
substance); Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 54–55 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); cf. Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 
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is often described as examining whether “the thing that was done is the thing 
which the statute intended.”113  The economic substance doctrine can be 
described as focusing on whether the claimed tax treatment goes beyond the 
tax benefits that Congress intended to grant.114   
Because legislative intent is so important to the economic substance 
analysis, it could potentially be applied as an additional factor.  For example, 
in Santander, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
concluded that a transaction lacked economic substance because the 
transaction had insufficient profit potential and violated congressional intent 
regarding the foreign tax credit.  The court’s analysis effectively treats 
congressional intent as another prong, i.e., as an additional inquiry separate 
from the objective and subjective tests.115  That approach of considering 
congressional intent does not appear to be foreclosed by Section 7701(o), as 
long as the objective and subjective prongs described in Section 7701(o) are 
also required to be met.  Instead, Section 7701(o) appears to leave courts able 
to decide whether to examine the congressional intent of the relevant tax 
benefit as part of determining whether a transaction meets the economic 
substance test, or to alternatively treat congressional intent inquiries as 
accomplished by means of the objective and subjective prongs rather than as 
a separate determination.   
The next question would be whether the Treasury has the authority to 
provide instead that the objective and subjective prongs are the exclusive 
factors to be considered in applying the economic substance test (if the 
Treasury wished to do so, even though such guidance would make victory 
harder for the government).  It is not entirely clear that this would be within 
the agency’s regulatory authority:  The statute says, “only if” rather than “if 
and only if,” so that interpreting section 7701(o) to mean the latter (“if and 
only if”) goes beyond the legislative language, and there is no specific grant 
 
1229, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reaching the opposite economic substance holding from Lerman and 
Gardner regarding losses under the same provision, “the canon of statutory interpretation that statutes 
should not be read to create ‘absurd results’ . . . is sensible, so far as it goes, but it can only be used to 
further Congress’ intent, not to circumvent it”); see also generally Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity 
and the Limits of Literalism:  Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AMER. 
UNIV. L. REV. 127 (1994); Steve Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes–Or Not: Plain Meaning and Other 
Phantoms, 10 J. APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS 321 (2009). 
 113.  Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
 114.  See infra note 115.   
 115.  See Santander, 844 F.3d at 23–24 (analyzing a STARS transaction that occurred before section 
7701(o)’s effective date); see also Salem II, 786 F.3d at 954 (as part of business purpose analysis: 
“Congress could not have intended to allow a taxpayer to claim a foreign tax credit, at the expense of 
U.S. tax revenue, for a transaction involving no commerce or bona fide business abroad and having no 
purpose other than to obtain foreign and domestic tax benefits.”). 
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of regulatory authority that covers this issue.116 
 
B. The Objective Prong 
 
1. Overview 
 
Section 7701(o)’s description of the objective prong begins with the 
requirement that “the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position. . . .”117  It thus 
provides that the objective test can be met by a change in economic 
circumstances, rather than only by profit potential.  Section 7701(o) also 
provides that profit potential can only be taken into account if reasonably 
expected profit is substantial compared to expected tax benefits (the ratio 
test).118  It further indicates that reasonably expected profit is computed at 
present value.119  Overall, the objective prong set forth in Section 7701(o) is 
largely consistent with most circuits’ formulations,120 but it contains the new 
requirements that change in economic position must be “meaningful” and 
that profit potential (if used to meet either prong) must meet the ratio test.  
Thus, the statute’s description of the objective prong may be interpreted as 
constraining the courts’ ability to adapt the objective prong in some respects.  
It contains a mix of elements that are left to Treasury guidance or to the 
courts (e.g., the meaning of the terms “substantial” and “meaningful”) and 
requirements that are more closely defined (e.g., under the profit ratio test, 
profit is measured based on the amount that is reasonably expected, as 
computed at present value). 
 
2. Change in Economic Position 
 
a. In General 
 
As described above, Section 7701(o) provides that the objective prong 
is met if “the transaction changes in a meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s 
 
 116.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o). 
 117.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).  This article sometimes abbreviates this “changes in a meaningful way” 
requirement as “meaningful change,” for brevity. 
 118.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 119.  See id. 
 120.  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 259–260 & n.56 (3d Cir. 1998) (saying that present value is an 
appropriate method for measuring profit); see also supra note 41, infra note 193. 
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economic position.”121  The Code language does not define either 
“meaningful” change or “economic position.”  That presumably leaves both 
terms open to judicial interpretation and Treasury guidance.  The latter takes 
priority (prospectively only, unless such guidance is cast as an anti-abuse 
rule under Section 7805)122 because the statute gives the IRS the authority to 
issue guidance,123 but no such guidance has yet been issued.124   
 
b. Lack of a “Reasonable Expectation” Standard 
 
The statutory reference to change in economic position is not modified 
by the “reasonable expectation” or “potential” concepts that apply to 
profit.125  Grammatically, Section 7701(o)(1)(A) states that a transaction 
meets the economic substance test only if it “changes in a meaningful  
way . . . the taxpayer’s economic position.”  This makes it sound as if the 
change in economic position must actually occur, not just be reasonably 
expected to occur.  However, “potential for profit” (if it passes the ratio test) 
is one element to take into account in evaluating this change in economic 
position.126  Thus, there is a possible conflict between the objective prong’s 
requirement for “change” (not just potential change) and the ratio test’s 
strong implication that “potential” profit can be taken into account under the 
objective prong. 
 There are multiple possible approaches to reconciling this apparent 
conflict.  For example, the profit ratio test (with its rule for the “potential for 
profit”) could be read as implying that potential change (or reasonable 
expectation) can be enough to meet the objective prong, without actual 
change in economic position even for economic change other than profit.  
 
 121.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
 122.  Section 7805 generally requires that tax regulations apply prospectively only.  See I.R.C. § 
7805(b)(1).  But it contains an exception for anti-abuse rules, which can apply retroactively.  See I.R.C. 
§ 7805(b)(3). 
 123.  See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (providing general regulatory authority to interpret Code provisions).   
 124.  To date, the IRS has issued two notices regarding section 7701(o), but neither defines 
“meaningful” change or “economic position.”  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (stating 
that the IRS will apply case law to determine whether a transaction meets the objective prong under 
section 7701(o)); I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
 125.  Compare I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (“transaction changes in a meaningful way . . . taxpayer’s 
economic position”) with I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (“potential for profit” can be taken into account only if 
“reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial” compared to expected net tax 
benefits).  The statutory version of the subjective prong, in contrast, neither specifically refers to 
reasonable expectation nor implies a lack of impact for reasonably expected or potential (but not actually 
occurring) profit or other economic effects.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 126.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).   
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But this interpretation is likely overbroad, because it seems to ignore the 
statutory requirement that a transaction “changes” (not just potentially 
changes) the taxpayer’s “economic position.”127 
 Alternatively, the statutory language seems better read as implying that 
the ability to consider potential or reasonably expected results applies only 
for profit (and only when profit potential passes the ratio test), and that other 
changes in economic position are subject to the higher standard of actually 
occurring.  This approach (although not perfect) at least attempts to give 
effect both to the profit ratio test’s concept of taking profit potential into 
account for the objective prong, and to the objective prong’s requirement for 
“change” in economic position. 
 The statute could also be read as meaning that even profit must actually 
occur (must both meet the ratio test, which examines “reasonably expected” 
profit, and also actually occur) before it can be taken into account under the 
objective prong, because the objective statutory test requires “change[]” 
rather than just “reasonably expected” or “potential” change.  But the courts 
and the IRS may be unlikely to make this argument.  Such an approach, if 
taken, might hold that 1) the profit ratio test compares reasonably expected 
profit to expected tax benefits, in order to determine whether “potential for 
profit” can be taken into account, but 2) only actual profit is considered under 
the objective prong, because the transaction must actually “change[] in a 
meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s economic position.”128  This two-part 
approach, however, fails to explain why the ratio test addresses the use of 
“potential for profit” for both prongs,129 if only actual profit is relevant for 
the objective prong.  It also seems to make the profit ratio test pointless and 
moot for the objective prong, which is inconsistent with the statute’s 
application of that test to both prongs.130  This interpretation thus seems 
unconvincing. 
 Alternatively, one could argue that profit potential (in the absence of 
actual profit) can be “taken into account”131 (i.e., considered) for purposes of 
the objective prong, but only to the extent that such profit potential produces 
actual change in economic position, such as a public relations effect or a 
change in stock price.  Yet this avenue is not quite persuasive, because such 
actual changes (resulting from profit potential) presumably could be taken 
 
 127.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).   
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  See id. 
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into account under the objective prong on their own merits, even if profit 
potential itself did not pass the ratio test.  This argument thus fails to keep 
the ratio test from being moot or meaningless for the objective prong. 
 Overall, there seems to be no perfect answer to the apparent conflict 
between the language of the objective prong (“change[]”) and the ratio test 
(“potential for profit”).  The best approach seems to be reading the objective 
test as requiring actual (not just potential) change, except that “potential for 
profit” (not just actual profit) can also be taken into account if such profit 
potential meets the ratio test. 
 
c. What is a Change in Economic Position? 
 
 In the absence of regulatory guidance, the first obvious question would 
be:  What is a change in “economic position”?  It likely is a broader concept 
than profit, because the statute includes rules about when profit (specifically, 
profit potential) can be taken into account to prove the required change in 
economic position (implying that there are other ways, besides profit, to 
show such a change).  Also, “economic position” is simply a different term 
than “profit,” indicating that they have different meanings.   
 The pre-Section-7701(o) case law similarly treated the objective prong 
as going beyond a mere profit inquiry.  Although the objective analysis is 
sometimes referred to as the profit test, many circuits had already held that 
this prong could be met by showing that the transaction caused a change in 
the taxpayer’s economic circumstances (as well as by showing that the 
transaction had profit potential).132  However, not all circuits had made such 
a statement (perhaps because not all circuits had considered the question).  
One of Section 7701(o)’s impacts is that it increases uniformity by requiring 
all circuits to define the objective prong more broadly than just profit 
potential.  This naturally raises questions about what can alter economic 
position other than expected profit, especially for a corporation.  Isn’t 
 
 132.  For example, BNY Mellon II concluded that a STARS transaction lacked profit potential, but 
then stated that the profit potential conclusion was not the end of the objective prong analysis.  The court 
went on to examine whether there was a change in economic position (apart from profit).  BNY Melon II, 
801 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1377 (2016).  See also, e.g., Santander, 844 F.3d 
at 25; ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 251 (3d Cir. 1998); UPS of America v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (“UPS really did lose the stream of income it had earlier reaped from excess-value charges.  
UPS genuinely could not apply that money to any use other than paying a premium to National Union; 
the money could not be used for other purposes. . . .”); Salem II, 786 F.3d at 949–50; In Re Cm Holdings, 
Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The main question these different formulations address is a simple 
one: absent the tax benefits, whether the transaction affected the taxpayer's financial position in any 
way.”).  Some of the cases cited above were decided after section 7701(o)’s enactment but analyzed 
transactions that occurred before that section’s effective date. 
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everything a corporation does ultimately aimed at potential profit?  Even for 
individuals, isn’t “economic” position necessarily about profit?   
 In addition to profit, “change[] in . . . economic position” might 
conceivably include changes in a taxpayer’s legal rights (apart from tax costs 
and benefits), and the legal rights of others regarding the taxpayer, even if 
such changes do not directly alter reasonably expected profit.  Such changes 
in legal rights might include, for example, subjecting oneself to the laws of 
a particular state or country, or to the potential claims of additional creditors, 
or increasing exposure to a particular borrower’s credit risk (e.g., by allowing 
the lapse of a loan guarantee).133  Although ultimately (perhaps indirectly) 
aimed at profit, these particular examples might change a taxpayer’s legal 
rights without directly altering reasonably expected profit. 
 Also, “change” is not limited to positive events.  Change in economic 
position could also include loss, rather than profit.134  Such an interpretation 
would be consistent with the pre-codification case law’s consideration of 
both upside and downside risks (i.e., the potential for either gain or loss) in 
the economic substance analysis.135  If a taxpayer reasonably expects a loss 
from a transaction, but has a non-tax business motive (such as publicity, or 
maintaining a business relationship), that set of facts potentially could meet 
the two prongs set forth in Section 7701(o).  (However, the publicity or 
continuing business relationship theoretically could lead, over time, to 
reasonably expected profit, which might be used to meet the objective prong 
without needing to look to other types of economic change.)  Even if a loss 
can qualify as a “change[] . . . in economic position,” are all tax benefits 
intended to apply to situations where the taxpayer reasonably expects a loss, 
or did Congress intend that some (not all) tax benefits be limited to potential 
profit situations?  The statutory language of Section 7701(o) may allow the 
answer to vary for different tax benefits (even those to which the economic 
 
 133.  Some of these possibilities raise issues similar to the distinction between tax and “business” 
transactions under the compulsory payment rule, within the foreign tax credit regulations.  See Treas. 
Reg. §1.901-2(e)(5)(i) (last sentence) (2013) (exception for business conduct, business structure, and 
form of a business transaction); I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2009-20-051 (May 15, 2009) (drawing 
a distinction between “business” and “tax” conduct for purposes of the compulsory payment rule); I.R.S. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 130972-06 (making the same distinction regarding a different fact pattern). 
 134.  See Jensen, Unguided, supra note 67, 32 J. TAX’N INV. 27, text accompanying n.37 (theorizing 
that selling an asset at a loss could satisfy the objective prong because “when an asset is converted into 
cash” there is “a clear change in economic position”).  
 135.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104 (contract terms carefully limited the potential for loss); 
Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (transaction had potential for both upside and downside 
risk); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 2001) (taxpayer had downside 
risk as well as profit potential) rev’ing Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 214, 225 (1999) 
(transaction was carefully engineered to eliminate any potential for loss); see also infra note 175.  
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substance doctrine is relevant).136 
 If an expected loss is used as the reason for meeting the objective prong, 
the taxpayer may face some challenges in meeting the subjective prong, 
regarding business purpose.  Taxpayers might cite, in such foreseeable-loss 
circumstances, subjective business purposes relating to publicity, business 
relationships, developing expertise, entering a new market, or similar 
motives.  (But such motives, as discussed above, might also lead to 
reasonably expected profit rather than loss, in the long term, making it 
unnecessary to look beyond profit potential in order to meet the objective 
prong.)  Such taxpayer theories might be more persuasive if the transaction 
is a normal, frequent aspect of the taxpayer’s business (e.g., for an oil 
company conducting speculative drilling, or a pharmaceutical company 
conducting research into potential new medicines, rather than an oil 
company investing in a new drug with uncertain medical uses). 
 Perhaps the ability to meet the objective prong using means other than 
profit potential is aimed at situations that may be so high risk (like oil drilling 
or the movie business) that reasonably expected profit (when risk-adjusted) 
is either hard to quantify or relatively low.137  Santander suggests that the 
option of meeting the objective prong without showing reasonably expected 
profit is meant to accommodate high-risk transactions or those that must wait 
a long time before one determines whether they will bear fruit or not.138  
(Product research and development, or prescription drug trials, are examples 
of investments that might or might not yield profit in the future, and whose 
results are hard to predict.)139   
 The Santander and Salem II cases—decided after section 7701(o)’s 
enactment—address transactions before Section 7701(o)’s effective date, but 
such courts use language similar to the statute: The cases discuss whether a 
transaction “meaningfully alter[] the taxpayer’s economic position (other 
 
 136.  Tax benefits intended for transactions that are expected to yield a loss might often be exempt 
from the economic substance test, under the relevance concept.  See, e.g., Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 
991–92 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing tax benefits relating to solar energy); Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  For example, the low income housing credit is arguably intended to apply even 
if losses are reasonably foreseeable, and the economic substance doctrine is generally said not to apply 
to such credits because of that specific congressional intent.  See, e.g., Joint Committee Report, supra 
note 65, at 152 n.344.   
 137.  However, cases like Cherin suggest addressing this issue by adjusting the required amount of 
profit based on industry profit norms.  See Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 993–94 (1987). 
 138.  See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 139.  See, e.g., Boeing v. Comm’r, 537 U.S. 437, 443 (2003) (it is hard to predict which research 
and development efforts will prove beneficial and which particular product lines might eventually benefit 
from research); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a) (same). 
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than with regard to the tax consequences).”140  The courts imply that the 
quoted language includes a concept that “some transactions that are not 
immediately profitable without tax benefits, such as investments in ‘nascent 
technologies’” may meet the objective prong by showing this change in 
economic circumstances.141  One could argue, though, that such transactions 
have no need to look beyond profit potential: These investments could 
probably meet the objective prong (depending on their facts) by computing 
reasonably expected profit over the life of the investment, rather than only 
for the initial period (unless profit is uncertain).  Such multiyear 
computations are used by most or all circuits in applying the economic 
substance doctrine, and also appear contemplated by 7701(o)’s rules.142   
 Of course, whether a risky or uncertain transaction is treated as yielding 
reasonably expected profit (e.g., future profit) is also affected by how the 
“transaction” is defined.  For example, even if a pharmaceutical company is 
unsure whether a particular prescription drug trial will ever yield a 
marketable product, the company certainly expects that the aggregate of all 
of its research activities and all of its drug trials will produce a net profit 
eventually.   
 Perhaps one technical difficulty (solved by allowing other-than-profit 
means of showing change in economic circumstance) is created because the 
economic substance doctrine generally treats the tested transaction as 
consisting of the activities that produce the tax benefit.143  However, 
businesses may evaluate the viability (potential profit) of their activities 
(such as research and development) based on a larger scale, e.g., by viewing 
the potential aggregate profitability of many activities together.  Therefore, 
any one research and development trial, for example,144 might have hard-to-
predict results, or an expected loss (yielding a change in economic position 
without profit), even though the sum of all of the corporation’s research and 
 
 140.  See Santander, 844 F.3d at 25 (quoting Salem II, 786 F.3d 932, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration 
made by Santander court)).  The quoted language above is very similar, but not quite identical, to Section 
7701(o)’s language on economic position.  The Section 7701(o) version reads: “changes in a meaningful 
way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position. . . .”  See I.R.C. § 
7701(o)(1)(A). 
 141.  Santander, 844 F.3d at 25 (citing Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 950 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015). 
 142.  Section 7701(o) looks to the present value of reasonably expected profit, which implies an 
examination of profit over the life of a transaction (rather than annually or in the short term).  See I.R.C. 
§ 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 143.  See infra notes 294 and 300. 
 144.  This example assumes, without deciding, that the economic substance test is relevant to the 
research and development credit.  See I.R.C. § 41. 
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development activities may have a net reasonably expected profit.  In such a 
situation, allowing the taxpayer to meet the objective prong by using change 
in economic position from a transaction, rather than reasonably expected 
profit from the transaction, may be appropriate from a policy perspective.  
(The subjective business motive, in such a situation, might include the 
advancement of the company’s expertise regarding a particular drug, as well 
as industry-norm small percentage potential for profit.) 
 
3. “Meaningful” 
 
 The next question would be: how does one determine whether a change 
in economic position is “meaningful”?145  The term “meaningful” is not 
defined in Section 7701(o).  The statutory use of the word “meaningful” 
rather than “substantial” (which appears in the profit ratio test and the 
business purpose prong)146 suggests that the two terms have different 
definitions.147  The usual connotations of “meaningful” seem to exclude a 
merely de minimis change in economic position (whether or not caused by 
profit that is “substantial” in relation to expected tax benefits).  “Meaningful” 
change could thus be more than the pre-codification economic substance 
case law required for the objective prong, depending on the circuit.148  
Because the required change in economic position is not limited to profit, 
there are also questions as to how to measure non-monetary changes, such 
as risk exposure or public relations impact, in order to determine if such 
changes are “meaningful.”  “Meaningful” is open to regulatory interpretation 
(if the Treasury chooses to issue guidance) or judicial reasoning.  Potential 
interpretations and considerations are discussed below. 
 Some of the case law regarding pre-Section 7701(o) transactions 
examines meaningful change in economic circumstances, as part of the 
 
 145.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
 146.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B) (“substantial purpose”); I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (“if the present 
value of the reasonably expected profit is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net 
tax benefits”). 
 147.  That would be a more helpful fact for statutory interpretation if “substantial” were defined, 
which it is not.  See id.; I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 148.  The IRS has said that it will follow case law (including pre-codification case law) in 
interpreting the objective and subjective prongs, until further notice.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 
I.R.B. 411.  But that may not be within the IRS’ authority, if the statutory requirement for “meaningful” 
change goes beyond what some circuits required before codification.   
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objective prong analysis.149  Courts’ references to meaningful change seem 
to be conveying the point that profit is not the only way to meet the objective 
prong.  But such case law does not give a clear standard for how to determine 
whether economic change is meaningful or sufficient.  In addition, such pre-
codification case law was not interpreting the language of Section 7701(o). 
 The statute is not entirely clear as to whether meaningful change just 
indicates that profit isn’t the only way to meet the objective prong, or 
whether it instead imposes a separate, additional standard, which could 
require more than just profit that is substantial in relation to tax benefits.  
Taxpayers will need to determine whether the meaningful change standard 
applies to profit (as an additional test, after the profit ratio test), or whether 
the ratio test is sufficient to show (without additional analysis of 
“meaningful” change) that profit potential meets the objective prong.  The 
statute does not literally require the latter conclusion:  the profit ratio test is 
the minimum requirement for taking profit potential into account, but is not 
described as necessarily sufficient to meet the objective prong in all 
circumstances.  Thus, the courts and the Treasury are free to take the former 
view, that “meaningful” change is an additional requirement that applies 
even to profit potential that passes the profit ratio test. 
 Meaningful appears to mean more than de minimis, but it is unclear how 
much more.  Nor does the statute specify how to measure when a change in 
economic situation is sufficient to be “meaningful,” including whether such 
change must be meaningful in an absolute sense or (instead) in comparison 
to another item (and, if so, in comparison to what).  Perhaps “meaningful” 
change in economic position requires change that is significant to the 
particular taxpayer.  For example, profit that is one-half the size of expected 
tax benefits is almost certainly “substantial” within the meaning of the ratio 
test, but could conceivably not be “meaningful” for the specific taxpayer.   
 Is “meaningful” potentially a qualitative concept, rather than 
quantitative?  Or does it incorporate both the size and the quality (or 
importance) of the economic change?  Can “meaningful” have different 
definitions for taxpayers who have different circumstances from each other?  
For example, could a $10,000 potential profit constitute a “meaningful” 
change in economic position for a local small business, but not for a large 
multinational corporation?  Could “meaningful” vary for different 
 
 149.  See Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Santander, 844 
F.3d 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2016).  These cases were decided after section 7701(o)’s enactment, although they 
address transactions that occurred before section 7701(o)’s effective date. 
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industries?150  For example, could a $10,000 potential profit be meaningful 
for an independent grocer, but not for a jeweler?  Industry alone seems a less 
compelling rationale for differing definitions of “meaningful” than a 
distinction based on facts and circumstances (including but not limited to 
total annual net profit from all activities—not just from the challenged 
transaction—for the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s consolidated group).151  
Should the challenged transaction’s relative profit (or other measure of 
significance) compared to average per-transaction profit for the taxpayer’s 
other transactions be taken into account?  In that case, high volume, low 
margin businesses (e.g., grocery stores) might have different economic 
substance results for a particular transaction than businesses with a low 
volume of transactions and high margin (e.g., oil drillers or fine art dealers).  
That does not necessarily seem to be a logical interpretation of the statutory 
language. 
 Defining “meaningful” to include a concept of either “significant” or 
“more than de minimis” raises conceptual issues, such as:  Assume that a 
large multinational corporation with billions of annual profits engages in a 
transaction that is reasonably expected to generate $5,000 of profit (a 
miniscule amount for that corporation, compared to its average profit on 
most of its transactions and compared to its annual net profit), and $25,000 
of tax benefits. Is that transaction automatically lacking in economic 
substance because it does not create “meaningful” change in economic 
 
 150.  This would be consistent with the concept in Cherin (and other cases) that the amount of profit 
that is sufficient can differ based on the norms in the relevant industry.  See Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 
986, 993–94 (1987).  However, this does not necessarily mean that industry-specific analysis is equally 
applicable to the determination of whether the transaction “changes in a meaningful way . . . the 
taxpayer’s economic position.”  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
 151.  For the reasons discussed in this paragraph of the text and the next paragraph, perhaps 
“meaningful” allows the government another chance to argue that more profit (or more change in 
economic position) is necessary than merely profit that is substantial in relation to tax benefits.  In the 
example above, $10,000 of profit might not be “meaningful” for a huge corporation even if $10,000 was 
substantial compared to expected tax benefits.  However, such an interpretation implies that if the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, a transaction lacks economic substance unless it creates a change 
in economic circumstances that is large enough to be “meaningful” for the relevant taxpayer.  Yet it seems 
unlikely that Congress really meant to disregard, as lacking economic substance, all transactions that 
yield relatively small results for the taxpayer (based on that particular taxpayer’s size and overall profits), 
absent other problematic circumstances.  Therefore, perhaps “meaningful” means something other than 
“relatively large for this taxpayer.”  Perhaps it means something closer to “more than de minimis” as an 
absolute matter, rather than relative to the taxpayer’s total annual profits (although that seems a low 
standard), or perhaps it is more of a qualitative standard than one based on size.  These are issues that the 
courts will have to grapple with.  Also, a transaction that passes the “meaningful” objective standard 
despite having a relatively small (for that taxpayer) profit might have difficulty showing the required 
substantial non-tax purpose—how would a large corporation show a substantial non-tax purpose for a 
transaction yielding $10,000 of profit (and significantly higher tax benefits)?  The answer likely depends 
on the taxpayer’s facts and circumstances. 
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situation?152 
 Surely the economic substance doctrine does not disallow tax benefits 
for all transactions that are relatively small (too small to be “meaningful”) 
for the particular taxpayer.  The troubling part of the small transaction 
described above is not its lack of size compared to total net profit from all 
transactions, but the relative size of this transaction’s expected profit 
($5,000) compared to tax benefits ($25,000).  Yet that unbalanced ratio of 
one to five is likely to meet the profit ratio test153 (i.e., it is likely 
“substantial”).  The definition of “meaningful” arguably isn’t the right place 
to address concerns about profit that is disproportionately small compared to 
tax benefits—but the profit ratio test doesn’t impose a very high standard, 
which could leave the courts searching for another argument.  For the 
hypothetical corporate taxpayer above, a transaction might instead yield five 
million dollars of expected profit, and twenty-five million dollars of 
expected tax benefits.  What is problematic is not the size of the profit (in an 
absolute sense or compared to total profits), but the ratio of profit to tax 
benefits.154   
 A transaction that had $5,000 of reasonably expected profit and $500 
of expected tax benefits is not as troubling (because smaller dollar amounts 
of tax benefits are involved and because profit exceeds tax benefits by a 
factor of ten).  But this transaction raises exactly the same questions about 
the definition of “meaningful” change, and whether $5,000 can be a 
 
 152.  Practically speaking, that is not a big enough tax benefit for such a large corporation to bother 
with (in terms of entering into a transaction in order to obtain such a relatively small tax benefit, with 
insufficient non-tax benefits).  Therefore, the example above may be moot because tax benefits for 
challenged transactions of high-annual-income taxpayers are likely to be relatively large.  Such large-tax-
benefit transactions will require a more-than-de-minimis profit (profit that is substantial compared to the 
large tax benefit) because of the profit ratio test, if the taxpayer is using profit potential to meet either of 
the two prongs.  If, instead, the example above showed expected net tax benefits of $250,000, the taxpayer 
could have trouble meeting the profit ratio test: $5,000 of reasonably expected profit might not be 
“substantial” in relation to $250,000 of expected net tax benefits. 
 153.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).   
 154.  Perhaps the size of the profit from this transaction, compared to size of aggregate profit from 
all transactions for the year (or the usual profit from each of the taxpayer’s transactions), is a factor better 
taken into account in analyzing whether there is substantial non-tax business purpose.  There again, 
however, non-tax business purpose that only represents 20 percent of the purpose for a transaction might 
be sufficient (depending on what “substantial” means in that context).  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B).  If 
business purpose must be substantial in an absolute sense, or in the context of taxpayer’s other activities, 
there may be an argument that a taxpayer with billions of annual profits did not have sufficient non-tax 
purpose for a $5,000-expected-profit transaction (especially one which is outside its usual industry or its 
usual business practices) that was expected to yield $150,000 of tax benefits.  Such debates will have to 
take into account, as mentioned above, that it is unlikely that Congress meant to disallow tax benefits for 
all relatively small transactions, a conclusion that implies that more than absolute size should be taken 
into account. 
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meaningful change for a corporation with billions of annual profits.   
 “Meaningful” is not measured as compared to expected tax benefits, 
unlike the profit ratio test.  This creates a negative inference that other-than-
profit methods of showing a change in economic position need not reach a 
particular ratio compared to expected tax benefits (or any other specific 
item), in order to show meaningfulness (at least until the courts or Treasury 
provide further interpretation).  That could be a big advantage for taxpayers 
with respect to other-than-profit methods of showing change in economic 
circumstances.  Query whether courts or the Treasury could require such a 
comparison to tax benefits even for other-than-profit indicators, or whether 
the negative inference described above is too strong to allow for contrary 
judicial or administrative interpretation.  The latter seems more likely to be 
the case.  A required comparison to an item other than tax benefits, however 
(e.g., the taxpayer’s net worth, or the average economic change from the 
taxpayer’s other transactions), is likely within the scope of acceptable 
judicial or administrative interpretation. 
 Given the absence of a statutory definition, the courts or Treasury can 
answer the questions above.  Those answers might arrive piecemeal, over 
time, in response to specific fact patterns.  Alternatively, administrative 
guidance might consist of a more comprehensive framework (e.g., in the 
form of regulations) that is not limited to a particular set of facts.  Given the 
Treasury’s apparent reluctance to issue guidance on Section 7701(o) in the 
near future,155 the answers seem to be left to the courts for now.  In that case, 
approaches could differ from circuit to circuit.   
 
4. Summary on the Objective Prong 
 
 The objective prong is not limited to profit:  It can be met by factors 
other than (or in addition to) profit.  Conversely, profit (even if it meets the 
ratio test) might not necessarily be sufficient to show meaningful change in 
economic position.  Section 7701(o) imposes the new standards of “changes 
in a meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s economic position”156 and, for the 
profit ratio test, “substantial” profit.  Those phrases are undefined, and 
 
 155.  See generally Rosenberg, Codification, supra note 109.  
 156.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).  Similar language on meaningful economic change was used by the 
Salem II court, in an opinion that was written after section 7701(o)’s enactment but related to a transaction 
occurring before section 7701(o)’s effective date.  See Salem II, 786 F.3d 932, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“What is critical is to identify transactions lacking economic reality, i.e., those that do not alter the 
taxpayer’s economic position in any meaningful way apart from their tax consequences, typically 
entailing no risk and no significant possibility of profit other than as a result of tax considerations.”), cert. 
denied 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016); see also Santander, 844 F.3d at 25. 
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therefore will be subject to interpretation by the courts and potentially (if it 
chooses to issue guidance) by the Treasury.  There are many other, smaller 
technical requirements imposed by the statute regarding the objective prong 
that will similarly need to be interpreted in the future.157   
 
C. The Subjective Prong 
 
1. Overview 
 
 In pre-Section 7701(o) case law on the economic substance doctrine, 
the business purpose prong generally received less emphasis than the 
objective prong.158  Often, the subjective prong was met or failed based on 
whether the taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of profit—the same factor 
that often proved crucial for the objective prong.159  Thus, the two prongs 
were often functionally duplicative of each other, in large part.   
 Section 7701(o), however, creates an implication that the subjective 
prong is of equal importance to and must differ from the objective prong.  
This may lead to a new emphasis on attempting to prove subjective non-tax 
intent without duplicating the objective prong’s analysis.  In addition, 
Section 7701(o) imposes new requirements that subjective non-tax intent 
must be “substantial” and that profit potential can only be taken into account 
for proving such intent if it meets the profit ratio test. 
 
2. Differs from Objective Prong 
 
 After Section 7701(o)’s effective date, the subjective prong (business 
purpose) must be considered, even in circuits that previously used the 
 
 157.  I.R.C. Section 7701(o) also contains restrictions on taking financial accounting benefits into 
account for purposes of the subjective prong—but not for the objective prong.  It states that, “[f]or 
purposes of paragraph (1)(B) [the subjective prong], achieving a financial accounting benefit shall not be 
taken into account as a purpose for entering into a transaction if the origin of such financial accounting 
benefit is a reduction in Federal income tax.”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(4).  This implies that “achieving a financial 
accounting benefit” can be considered in determining changes in “economic position” (which are not 
limited to profit), even if such financial accounting benefits derive from the challenged federal income 
tax benefits.  For example, financial accounting benefits that improve stock price, or smooth the way for 
a merger, could conceivably contribute to a “meaningful” change in “economic position,” even if such 
benefits are caused by claimed federal income tax results.  Such a taxpayer would still, however, need to 
meet the subjective prong without taking such financial accounting benefits into account (because section 
7701(o) now requires that both prongs be met).  The taxpayer would therefore need a “substantial” non-
tax purpose other than financial accounting effects. 
 158.  See supra note 13. 
 159.  See supra note 12, and infra note 205. 
DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  10:28 AM 
Winter 2019              CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 89 
 
 
disjunctive test or the flexible approach.  In addition, the structure of Section 
7701(o)(1), which says that a transaction meets the economic substance 
requirement only if it meets both prongs, implies that the business purpose 
test is different from the objective test.  Otherwise, there would be no need 
to list two prongs.160  The rules of statutory interpretation mandate against 
reading statutory language as moot, duplicative, or unnecessary, whenever 
possible.161  These rules appear to require that “substantial purpose (other 
than Federal income tax effects)” (the subjective prong) must mean 
something different than “the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart 
from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position”162 (the 
objective prong), because if the two phrases were identical then one of them 
would be superfluous and moot. 
 This marks an important change from the manner in which the 
subjective prong was often applied before codification:  In practice, the 
business purpose analysis was often duplicative of the profit inquiry, 
especially for corporate taxpayers.163  Further, interpreting the business 
purpose prong as being different from the objective prong can only hurt 
taxpayers and help the government: Two different prongs (both required) 
must be less favorable for the taxpayer than one of such prongs repeated 
twice. 
 The IRS does not seem to agree with this reading that the two prongs 
must differ from each other:  It has said that it will continue to apply 
economic substance case law in order to define the subjective prong.164  All 
of such case law currently addresses transactions that occurred before 
Section 7701(o)’s effective date, so all of such cases interpret pre-Section 
 
 160.  One could consider whether listing two prongs means that the business purpose prong can 
differ from the objective prong, but does not have to do so.  In that case, though, there would be no reason 
for the statute to require two prongs instead of one, because meeting the business purpose prong would 
be optional rather than mandatory.  As discussed above, the conjunctive and disjunctive versions of the 
economic substance doctrine are essentially the same, in practice, if the objective and subjective prongs 
are met by the same facts (usually profit potential).  Congress’ imposing a conjunctive test implies that 
the two prongs are different from each other because, if the two analyses are identical, the conjunctive 
and disjunctive tests always reach the same results as each other. 
 161.  See, e.g., Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature 
was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed”); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A 
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous, void or insignificant”); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume 
that Congress used two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous 
meaning.”); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577–78 (1995). 
 162.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
 163.  See supra note 12, and infra note 205. 
 164.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411. 
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7701(o) law.  That case law, as mentioned above, often treated the subjective 
prong as analyzing the same elements (chiefly profit and risk) that were used 
for the objective prong.165  
 Thus, the IRS’s position appears to be that section 7701(o) has not 
changed the content of the subjective prong.  But it is likely not within the 
IRS’s authority to determine that the objective and subjective prongs can be 
duplicative of each other, even if pre-Section-7701(o) case law implicitly 
takes that approach.  Instead, rules of statutory interpretation, created by 
Supreme Court precedent and by other case law, require that statutes 
(including the Internal Revenue Code) must be read so as to prevent any 
language from being moot.166   
 Even if the IRS proposes that the business purpose test means what it 
did under pre-enactment case law, courts are not bound by that decision if it 
exceeds the IRS’ regulatory authority.  Instead, courts can (and should) hold 
that the subjective prong must mean something different than the objective 
prong once Section 7701(o) applies.  However, practically speaking, if the 
IRS or the Department of Justice, litigating on behalf of the government, 
concedes the business purpose prong in litigation, or stipulates that the 
business purpose prong is met where there is sufficient profit to meet the 
objective prong, it may be debatable whether the courts are able or willing 
to apply a different interpretation of the subjective prong on their own 
initiative.167 
 Given the wording of section 7701(o), the statutory version of the 
business purpose prong may be best read as requiring at least some 
component other than, or in addition to, profit potential (or economic change, 
if used by the taxpayer instead of profit potential), in order to prevent its 
analysis from duplicating that under the objective prong.  The statute implies, 
though,  that there may be some overlap between the objective and subjective 
 
 165.  See supra note 12, and infra note 205. 
 166.  See supra note 161 (statutory language generally should not be read as moot).  In addition, if 
the objective and subjective prongs were duplicative of each other, there would be no reason to require 
the conjunctive test in Section 7701(o) rather than, for example, requiring that all circuits consider the 
objective prong.  Requiring the conjunctive test (and thus creating greater uniformity among the circuits) 
was among Congress’ stated goals in enacting Section 7701(o).  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 295, 297; 
see also Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 152.  Congress described that section as both 
“clarifying” and "enhancing" the economic substance doctrine.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 295; see 
also Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 152.  The term “clarifying” indicates a lack of a major 
change from pre-enactment case law, but Congress also used the additional term “enhance,” which 
implies change that makes the doctrine more rigorous.   
 167.  See generally Rosenberg, Codification, supra note 109 (discussing an agency’s (in this case, 
the IRS’) ability to ignore congressional intent and taxpayers’ likely choice not to challenge any such 
administrative approach that is taxpayer-favorable). 
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prongs (even if there cannot be complete identity): The profit ratio test 
applies to both prongs,168 suggesting that profit potential can be taken into 
account for purposes of both tests.169  This strongly implies that profit 
potential is at least relevant for the business purpose prong (or can be, in 
some circumstances). 
 However, the compelling indication that the two prongs must differ 
from each other implies that perhaps profit cannot be the sole factor used for 
meeting both prongs (in any given fact pattern).  But how different do the 
two prongs’ analyses have to be?170  Is there a reasonable argument that the 
objective prong considers profit potential and other factors (all of which 
contribute to the analysis of whether there has been the required meaningful 
change in economic position), and the subjective prong considers profit 
potential and other factors (all in order to analyze the required substantial 
business purpose), but that both can be met (in any given fact pattern, for any 
particular transaction) by using exactly the same facts (e.g., profit potential 
alone, or profit potential plus one minor additional factor)?   
 If, under a proposed pair of definitions for the two prongs, one cannot 
imagine plausible circumstances in which the two prongs could differ from 
each other (i.e., could take into account different facts from each other or 
reach different results), then such a pair of definitions appears at risk of being 
invalid, by reason of the statutory implication that the two prongs must differ 
from each other.  If the Treasury or the courts set forth pro forma 
interpretations of the two prongs, but reasonably expected profit is really the 
determining factor for both analyses (despite the additional factors nominally 
considered for each prong), would that be valid as a matter of statutory 
interpretation?   
 No taxpayer is likely to challenge a duplicative interpretation of the two 
prongs, but the government (if a court proposed such a set of definitions) or 
the courts (if Treasury guidance or government litigation took such a 
position) might think otherwise. 
 It might be more easily defensible, under the rules of statutory 
interpretation, to say that either the objective or subjective prong (for any 
particular transaction) can be based on reasonably expected profit, but not 
both.  For example, either Treasury or the courts could interpret the 
 
 168.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
169.     See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (listing the two prongs). 
   170.    There is also a distinction between saying that the definitions of the two statutory prongs 
cannot be identical and saying that the facts or arguments used (for a particular transaction) to meet the 
two prongs cannot be the same.  In the former case, taxpayers could attempt to use the same factors to 
meet two differently described standards (objective and subjective). 
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combination of the profit ratio test (applicable to both prongs) and the 
requirement for separate objective and subjective prongs as meaning that a 
taxpayer who meets the objective prong primarily by showing profit 
potential must meet the subjective prong primarily by using facts other than 
profit potential (or vice versa).  Such a possible interpretation leaves the 
question of what facts can be used to meet either test, other than profit 
potential.   
 
3. Meaning of Business Purpose 
 
 Business purpose is referred to in Section 7701(o) as a “substantial 
purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects),”171 but is not further defined 
in the statute.  If it is not duplicative of the objective prong (e.g., a profit 
inquiry and meaningful change concept), it is not totally clear what business 
purpose means or how it is tested.  Profit potential is one element (often the 
primary consideration) in the business purpose analysis under pre-Section-
7701(o) case law.172  The applicability of the ratio test to the subjective 
prong173 indicates that profit potential can continue to be relevant in 
determining business purpose.  Another possible factor is likely to be the 
taxpayer’s due diligence, which is examined in some of the pre-Section-
7701(o) case law.174  Some cases have also considered whether the presence 
of risk shows a real business intent.175  But other courts have disparaged that 
consideration, arguing that absence of risk merely shows good business 
 
 171.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 172.  See supra note 12, and infra note 205. 
 173.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 174.  See, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 92–93 (4th Cir. 1985); Casebeer v. 
Comm’r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990); Rose v. Comm’r, 868 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1989); IES 
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 355 (8th Cir. 2001); cf. Mahoney v. Comm’r, 808 F.2d 1219, 
1220 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing a lack of business-like conduct as an indication of a sham); but see 
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 224–25 (1999), rev’d 277 F. 3d 778, 787 n.9 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (discounting the importance of due diligence, “Even if we agreed with the Tax Court that 
Compaq had not adequately investigated the risks, it would not make a difference to the outcome of this 
case.  Though Compaq could have done more to evaluate the risks of the transaction, the process it used 
does not alone prove a lack of business purpose for a transaction that had real risks.”). 
 175.  See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 214, 223–24 (1999) (discussing lack 
of risk), rev’d 277 F.3d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 2001) (transaction had risk); DeMartino v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 
400, 406 (2d Cir. 1988) (transactions “were prearranged, contrived transactions conducted in a market 
rigged to produce tax losses”); Yosha v. Comm’r, 861 F.2d 494, 500-501 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing lack 
of risk, but not specifying that this factor related only to motive or a subjective analysis: “The investor 
was at no risk. . . . .  The lack of substance lies in the fact that the investor had zero prospect of gain or 
loss. The brokers were selling tax losses.”); see also supra note 135.  
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planning.176  Some courts have also discussed whether the marketing 
materials or the taxpayer’s discussions about whether to enter into the 
transaction emphasized tax benefits (rather than profit).177  It is not clear what 
other factors might be included in evaluating business purpose but are not 
also taken into account for the objective prong.   
 The lack of a statutory definition leaves the meaning of the business 
purpose prong open to judicial and administrative interpretation.  However, 
those interpretations are constrained by Section 7701(o)’s implication that 
the business purpose prong must differ from the objective prong.  At the 
moment, the IRS seems content to leave the explanation of “business 
purpose” to the courts.178  The IRS has said only that it will continue to look 
to case law (which currently includes only pre-Section 7701(o) cases) in 
order to interpret the business purpose prong.179 
 There is thus likely some work ahead for the courts and litigants, in 
order to comb the vast economic substance case law for factors other than 
profit that have been used to evaluate business purpose and that are not 
duplicative of the objective prong analysis.180  Because of the implication 
that the subjective prong now must differ from the objective prong, there will 
likely be more emphasis in the future on what elements exactly, other than 
or in addition to profit, contribute to the subjective prong analysis. 
 
4. Lack of Reasonableness Requirement 
 
 Section 7701(o) does not explicitly impose a reasonableness 
requirement for business purpose.181  (In contrast, expectation of profit has a 
reasonableness requirement, contained in the ratio test, although meaningful 
change in economic position otherwise does not.)182  This absence in the 
business purpose test leaves open, for judicial analysis or administrative 
guidance, the question of whether “business purpose” must be reasonable, 
rather than just sincerely held.  Is there a different answer (on such a 
reasonableness concept) for individuals and corporations?  If business 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784–85, 787 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(lack of risk doesn’t prevent a transaction from meeting the economic substance test); IES, 253 F.3d at 
355. 
 177.  See, e.g., In Re CM Holdings, Inc., 301 F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 178.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411.  
 179.  See id. 
 180.  See Rosenberg, STARS Wars, supra note 68, at 227–35.  
 181.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 182.  Compare I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) with I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
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purpose must be reasonable, how is it different from reasonable expectation 
of profit, which is generally the focus of the objective prong?  None of these 
questions are answered by Section 7701(o). 
 The presence of a reasonableness requirement in the ratio test, however, 
may create a negative inference that reasonableness is not required for 
business purpose.  Query, though, whether Congress generally intended tax 
benefits to apply for taxpayers whose non-tax purpose was not reasonable.  
Conceivably, that answer could differ for different tax benefits, depending 
the congressional intent for each such benefit. Such intent could impact the 
application of the business purpose requirement, because congressional 
intent is crucial for the economic substance inquiry.   
 Not applying a reasonableness requirement could create some practical 
difficulties: How can the IRS and courts test sincere subjective intent that 
isn’t reasonable?  From behavior, a la Cherin?  (The taxpayer in Cherin 
stopped paying the tax shelter promoter when he realized that the expected 
profit results were not materializing.)183 
 
5. Substantial 
 
 Section 7701(o) requires that the taxpayer’s non-Federal-income-tax 
purpose be “substantial.”184  The term “substantial” is not defined.  
“Substantial” is the same word used in the profit ratio test185 and therefore 
impliedly has the same meaning.  The ratio test, however, measures 
substantiality by comparison to expected tax benefits, which the business 
purpose test does not.186  Nor does the ratio test define “substantial.”  (The 
objective prong, in contrast, requires a “meaningful,” rather than 
“substantial,” change in economic position.)187  Because “substantial” is 
undefined, it is left to the courts to interpret (or to the Treasury to address by 
guidance, if it chooses to do so). 
 In any event, “substantial” business purpose appears to be a significant 
increase from prior requirements in the case law.  Pre-Section-7701(o) cases 
varied in their descriptions of how much non-tax purpose was required.  
However, some courts were satisfied as long as a transaction was not 
“solely” tax motivated, sometimes even if the taxpayer was “primarily” 
 
 183.  See Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 989–91 (1987). 
 184.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 185.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 186.  Compare id. to I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
 187.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
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motivated by tax benefits.188 
 Under the statutory language, “substantial” business purpose is 
analyzed separately for each taxpayer.189  Thus, if one transaction involves 
twelve taxpayers, of whom eleven have a substantial business purpose and 
one does not, the one that does not will fail the business purpose prong 
regarding the transaction. 
 Can the courts or the Treasury, by guidance, require business purpose 
that is greater than “substantial”?  Under the literal language of the statute 
and the rules of statutory interpretation, the answer appears to be yes.  The 
statute says that a transaction has economic substance “only if” it has 
“substantial” business purpose, not “if and only if.”  However, it is hard to 
imagine the courts or Treasury choosing to take this approach. 
 
6. Business Purpose Summary 
 
 The structure of Section 7701(o), combined with statutory 
interpretation rules that avoid construing legislative language as moot, 
strongly imply that the subjective prong cannot be a mere duplicate of the 
objective prong.  The fact that profit potential can be taken into account for 
both prongs indicates that the facts and circumstances used to meet the two 
prongs can overlap, but does not overcome the strong presumption that the 
two prongs must differ from each other.  Because courts are now required to 
apply both prongs, there is likely to be increased focus on the subjective 
prong in the future, as compared to a previous emphasis on the objective 
prong.190  In addition, business purpose is now required to be at least 
“substantial” in order to meet the economic substance test.191  This is a higher 
standard than the courts generally imposed before Section 7701(o)’s 
enactment. 
 
 
D.  Profit 
 
1. In General 
 
 
 188.  See, e.g., Compaq, 277 F.3d at 786 (quoting ACM, 157 F.3d 23, 248 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 189.  Section 7701(o)(1) states that each transaction satisfies the economic substance test only if “the 
taxpayer has a substantial purpose . . . .”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (emphasis added).   
 190.  See note 13, supra. 
 191.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
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 The use of profit in the economic substance analysis, as modified by 
Section 7701(o), is a multi-step process: First there is the question of whether 
profit potential can be “taken into account” for the two prongs.  This 
preliminary inquiry is governed by the ratio test.  Only then, after that 
preliminary hurdle is passed, does one ask whether such profit potential, 
allowed to be taken into account after application of the ratio test, constitutes 
or helps to prove either “meaningful” change in economic circumstances or 
“substantial” non-tax purpose, or both.192   
 Profit has traditionally been a key factor in both the objective and 
subjective analyses, under pre-Section 7701(o) case law.193  Although 
Section 7701(o) does not define the term “profit,”194 it does provide several 
technical rules for its computation.  First, profit potential may not be taken 
into account under either prong unless the transaction meets the profit ratio 
test, which applies a standard of “substantial” in relation to expected net 
tax benefits.195  Second, the relevant amount that is compared to expected 
tax benefits is the “reasonably expected” profit, “pre-tax,” and computed 
at present value.196  Lastly, profit does not include either federal income 
tax effects or any state and local tax effects that are “related to” federal 
income tax effects.197  
 The focus on reasonably expected, rather than actually materializing, 
profit (for purposes of the economic substance analysis) was already present 
 
 192.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (B). 
 193.  Profit is often the start of and a key to the objective analysis.  See, e.g., Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 
T.C. 738, 767–68 (1990); Pritired 1, LLC v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 736–39 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 
30, 2011); BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 115, 119 (2d Cir. 205) (profit is a focus of the objective analysis, 
but not the end of the inquiry); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States,253 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 2001); Rice’s 
Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 1985).  Profit has been an important factor not 
only for objective analyses, but for the subjective prong as well.  See infra note 205; see also supra note 
12. 
 194.  The profit ratio test refers to both “potential for profit” and “reasonably expected pre-tax 
profit.”  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  It is not clear that these two phrases have the same meaning as each 
other—presumably, Congress would have used the same phrase twice if that were the case.  See supra 
note 161. 
 195.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  Technically, this limitation applies only to “[t]he potential for profit” 
rather than actual profit.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  For example, if a transaction was reasonably 
expected to result in $7 of profit, but actually resulted in $1 or $15, the profit ratio rule technically only 
applies to whether the taxpayer can take the $7 into account for both prongs, not whether it can consider 
the $1 or the $15.  In theory, the courts or Treasury could provide (in case law or guidance, respectively) 
that actual profit is taken into account in some manner (e.g., as a post-hoc factor that helps evaluate 
whether the taxpayer’s claimed expectation of profit was reasonable, either for the objective prong or as 
part of the business purpose analysis).  As discussed above, actual profit may also be relevant to the 
determination of “meaningful [change in] . . . economic position.”  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
 196.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 197.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (o)(3). 
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in the pre-Section-7701(o) case law.198  In addition, reasonably expected 
profit is measured at its present value under Section 7701(o)’s profit ratio 
test.199  This implies that such profit is measured in the aggregate, over the 
entire multiyear life of a transaction, rather than annually, although the 
statute does not actually say so.  Such life-of-the-transaction aggregate profit 
measurements would also be consistent with the pre-Section-7701(o) case 
law.200  Section 7701(o)’s inclusion of these concepts does provide some 
uniformity on these profit measurement rules across all circuits, including 
any that had not yet spoken on these measurement conventions.  It also 
prevents any circuit from changing its mind on either concept.201   
 Section 7701(o) also imposes a ratio test (discussed further below) for 
profit potential:  Profit potential is only taken into account, for purposes of 
either prong, if reasonably expected profit is “substantial in relation to the 
present value of the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the 
transaction were respected.”202  This ratio test thus has two main 
components: First, reasonably expected profit must be at least “substantial” 
in order for profit potential to be taken into account.  Second, “substantial” 
is determined not as an absolute matter, but in comparison to expected net 
tax benefits. 
2. Substantial Profit Might Not Always Be Sufficient to 
Meet the Objective or Subjective Prongs 
 
 
 198.  See, e.g., Estate of Thomas v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 412, 428–29 (1985). 
 199.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 200.  See, e.g., Kirchman v. Comm’r , 862 F.2d 1486, 1493–94 (11th Cir. 1989); Glass v. Comm’r, 
87 T.C. 1087, 1173–74 (1986) (“the focus of our attention is petitioners’ entire tax straddle scheme, and 
not each separate straddle.  It is the overall scheme which taints the deductibility of the year one losses.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Estate of Thomas v. Comm’r , 84 T.C. 412, 438 (1985); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 
94 T.C. 738, 768–69 (1990). 
 201.  In addition, section 7701(o) requires that fees and transaction costs are treated as expenses and 
netted against income in order to determine pre-tax profit.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B).  “Profit” already means 
gross income netted against costs, so it is not clear why Congress felt it needed a rule specifically 
addressing transaction costs and fees.   
 202.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  The statutory language provides that profit potential is taken into 
account for the objective “and” subjective prongs only if it meets the profit ratio test.  Id.  It thus reads as 
if profit only needs to meet the ratio test if the taxpayer is taking profit into account for both prongs, not 
if the taxpayer is taking profit into account for only one or the other.  Congress could have avoided doubt 
on this issue by writing that profit potential can be taken into account “for purposes of subparagraph (A) 
or (B), or both.”  Imagine, for example, that the taxpayer is meeting one of the prongs by using something 
other than profit, e.g., meeting the business purpose prong by showing due diligence or satisfying the 
objective prong by showing non-profit “change . . . in economic position.”  Could the taxpayer then 
analyze the other prong using profit potential that did not meet the ratio test?  Presumably, this is not what 
Congress intended.  The Treasury Department could clarify, in guidance, that the ratio test is not waived 
in situations where only one prong uses profit as a factor. 
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 Section 7701(o) does not say that reasonable expectation of profit (even 
substantial pre-tax profit, as compared to expected tax benefits) is 
necessarily sufficient, on its own, to prove that the transaction “changes in a 
meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s economic position” as mandated by the 
objective prong or that the taxpayer has the “substantial [business] purpose” 
required by the subjective prong.  Instead, the profit ratio rule only says that 
“[t]he potential for profit . . . shall be taken into account . . . only if” it meets 
the ratio test.203  The ratio test is thus an initial hurdle before profit can be 
“taken into account,” not a promise that the transaction will meet the 
economic substance doctrine.   
 However, under pre-Section-7701(o) case law, reasonably expected 
profit is almost always sufficient (without more) to meet the objective prong, 
at least if pre-U.S.-tax profit is large enough, compared to expected U.S. tax 
benefits.204  In other words, the courts have not generally required that the 
taxpayer show more than a sufficient amount of profit (other factors in 
addition to profit) in order to meet the objective prong.  Under pre-Section-
7701(o) case law, expected profit has also been a major factor (perhaps the 
determining factor) for the subjective prong.205  The IRS has stated that it 
 
 203.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 204.  See supra note 193.  
 205.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104,118 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The focus [for the business purpose 
prong] is the reasonableness of the transaction and can be articulated as: would ‘a prudent investor,’ 
absent tax benefits, ‘have made the deal?’”) (citation omitted); id. at 123, 124; Compaq Computer Corp. 
v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 786–87 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In light of what we have said about the nature of 
Compaq's profit, both pre-tax and post-tax, we conclude that the transaction had a sufficient business 
purpose independent of tax considerations.”); ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 253–54, 257 (3d Cir. 1998); Salem II, 
786 F.3d 932, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding that a loan met the economic substance doctrine because it 
gave the taxpayer access to funds, “the STARS Loan in this case functioned to provide financing to 
BB&T, which is a legitimate business purpose.”); id. at 952; Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 
89, 92–93 (4th Cir. 1985) (“More critical [to the business purpose analysis]  is the evidence that Rice paid 
an inflated purchase price for the computer”); Kirchman v. Comm’r , 862 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir. 
1989); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2013-225, 2013 WL 5311057 at *4 (2013) 
(“the loan proceeds were available for petitioner to use in its banking business throughout the STARS 
transaction.  Accordingly, the loan served a purpose beyond the creation of tax benefits . . . .”), aff'd, 801 
F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied 136 S.Ct. 1377 (2016); Shriver v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 724, 726 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (“The business purpose inquiry examines whether the taxpayer was induced to commit capital 
for reasons only relating to tax considerations or whether a non-tax motive, or legitimate profit motive, 
was involved.”); UPS of America v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A ‘business 
purpose’ does not mean a reason for a transaction that is free of tax considerations. Rather, a transaction 
has a ‘business purpose,’ when we are talking about a going concern like UPS, as long as it figures in a 
bona fide, profit-seeking business. . . . .”) (citation omitted); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 767 (1990) 
(profit potential was not the only factor, but “the sole objective was to obtain the interest deduction. This 
is abundantly evidenced by the use of repos to market with locked-in losses in the transactions with no 
potential for any profit . . . .  Accordingly, . . . the overriding and clear intent was to seek the interest 
deduction.”); Glass v. Comm’r , 87 T.C. 1087, 1175–76 (1986); IRS v. Cm Holdings (in Re Cm Holdings, 
Inc.) 301 F.3d 96, 102–103, 106–107 (3rd Cir. 2002); Fox v. Comm’r , 82 T.C. 1001, 1023 (1984) (stating, 
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will follow the case law’s interpretation of the two prongs for now, in 
interpreting section 7701(o)’s two prongs.206 
 But the case law has evolved before, in response to taxpayers’ changing 
strategies and the resulting continuous presentation of new and different fact 
patterns before the courts.207  The statutory language of the profit ratio rule, 
and the lack of a statutory requirement that any transaction that meets the 
profit ratio test must always be treated as meeting both prongs (or even the 
objective prong) appears to leave it open for the courts to decide, over time, 
that more than the described “substantial” (compared to tax benefits) profit 
is required to meet one or both prongs.  In other words, courts appear still 
able to hold that even a transaction that has such substantial profit can lack 
economic substance in particular circumstances. 
 That’s an important area of flexibility for the courts.  Theoretically, for 
example, a court could decide (depending on facts and circumstances) that 
even profit that is “substantial” in relation to expected tax benefits (e.g., 
profit that is one-third of the size of expected tax benefits) might not 
represent a meaningful change in the taxpayer’s economic position.  Viewed 
slightly differently, courts appear able to consider, even after “substantial” 
profit is proven, whether other facts and circumstances nonetheless defeat 
compliance with the objective prong or the subjective analysis.  This puts 
some pressure on the interpretation of “meaningful” in the description of the 
objective prong.208  Conversely, this may also be an area where Treasury 
 
as part of analyzing the taxpayer’s motives: “petitioner . . . did not appear to make profit-maximizing 
decisions.”); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating, 
without distinguishing between factors relevant for the objective and subjective analyses, that “The tax 
court found, without challenge here, that the program could never generate a pretax profit.”), cert. denied 
535 U.S. 986 (2002); Karr v. Comm’r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1024–25 (11th Cir. 1991) (using the same facts to 
analyze the objective and subjective aspects of the economic substance tests); see also Estate of Thomas 
v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 412, 437–38 (1985); but see Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 994 (1987) (“The 
economic substance of a business transaction and the intent, purpose, or motive of an individual investor, 
while sometimes equated, are not identical.  A business transaction by its very nature must have economic 
substance, that is, a realistic potential for profit . . . .  The intent or purpose, which motivates an individual 
to enter into a business transaction refers to the subjective state of mind of the particular taxpayer before 
the Court.”).   
 206.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411; see also supra part III C (arguing that the 
section 7701(o) version of the subjective prong now must differ from the section 7701(o) version of the 
objective prong, so that it might not be possible to use the same factors (e.g., profit potential alone) to 
meet both prongs). 
 207.  For example, the economic substance case law evolved over time from saying that a transaction 
must have reasonably expected profit to requiring (at least in some courts) that such profit must be more 
than de minimis, or more than insignificant, compared to tax benefits.  See infra note 320, and supra note 
211; see also, e.g., Pritired 1, LLC v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 741 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2011). 
 208.  The subjective prong, as discussed below, may require (rather than merely allow) consideration 
of elements other than profit.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B); see also supra part III C. 
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guidance (which is only possible because of the enactment of Section 
7701(o)) could constrain the courts’ ability to adapt the doctrine.  
 On the other hand, Section 7701(o) also does not require that every 
transaction to which the economic substance doctrine applies must have 
reasonably expected profit that is at least substantial as compared to tax 
benefits.  The statute mandates that the profit ratio test must be met before 
profit potential can be taken into account for the two prongs of the economic 
substance test.  But it does not say that a transaction lacking such 
“substantial” profit potential necessarily fails the economic substance 
analysis (or either prong).  However, if profit potential doesn’t rise to that 
minimum standard, the taxpayer will need other, different means of showing 
meaningful change in economic position and substantial non-tax purpose. 
 
3. Profit Ratio Test 
 
a. In General 
 
 As discussed above, Section 7701(o) provides that “potential for profit” 
may not be taken into account for purposes of the two prongs unless  
“the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net 
tax benefits . . . .”209  This profit ratio test is quite lenient:  It allows 
disproportionate ratios between expected profit and tax benefits, as long as 
the “substantial” ratio standard is met.  For example, reasonably expected 
profit of one and expected net tax benefits of four are likely to meet the test, 
because one to four (25 percent) is likely a “substantial” ratio.  A lenient 
standard is consistent with the theory that the economic substance doctrine 
is an emergency backstop that is supposed to deny tax benefits to “the worst 
of the worst.”  Also, a tolerant standard enhances predictability.  For 
example, taxpayers who have reasonably expected profit equal to half of 
their expected tax benefits are likely not worried about whether they can 
meet the profit ratio test. 
 One basic issue is whether the ratio test prevents courts or the IRS from 
 
 209.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  The language of the ratio test strikingly resembles the language in 
I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334 (withdrawn).  That notice addressed certain withholding tax and 
cross-border-arbitrage situations.  It predicted the issuance of regulations that would deny foreign tax 
credits to such fact patterns if “reasonably expected economic profit is insubstantial compared to the value 
of the foreign tax credits expected to be obtained as a result of the arrangement.”  The notice was 
withdrawn without the issuance of such regulations.  See I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606.  But 
taxpayers continue to cite the ratios in Notice 98-5’s examples as guidelines for acceptable profit-to-tax-
benefit proportions.  See, e.g., Pritired, 816 F. Supp. at 729, 741. 
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deciding that profit needs to be higher in relation to tax benefits before it is 
sufficient to meet the objective prong.  Technically, such an interpretation 
appears possible, because the ratio test is only the minimum requirement 
before profit can be “taken into account,” not the ultimate answer to the 
objective prong analysis.  Another question is whether the ratio test applies 
to both prongs, or only one or the other, for any given transaction.  Both 
issues are discussed further below. 
 
b. Substantial Profit 
 
 Before Section 7701(o), multiple cases had already said that profit was 
not sufficient to meet the objective prong if it was merely “de minimis” or 
“insignificant” in relation to tax benefits.210  But those cases did not require 
“substantial” profit, which appears to be a higher standard than merely an 
amount greater than “de minimis.” (However, there is little on-point case law 
on the specific meaning of “de minimis,” “insignificant,” and other terms 
used in the case law in this context).  Section 7701(o) thus may have made 
the objective prong a little harder for taxpayers to meet than pre-Section 
7701(o) case law required.  Also, if a particular circuit court of appeals had 
addressed only transactions that clearly had zero profit, such circuit court 
might not have had occasion to discuss whether miniscule (but greater than 
zero) profit was sufficient.211  Section 7701(o) thus imposes a new standard 
for taking profit potential into account (“substantial”) and a rule about 
determining that standard by reference to tax benefits, rather than as an 
absolute number or by comparison to some other amount.212  It also makes 
those rules applicable to all circuits, which imposes some minimum level of 
 
 210.  See, e.g., Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990); see also infra note 341; see also 
generally Rosenberg, STARS Wars, supra note 68; cf. I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334 (withdrawn) 
(predicting the issuance of regulations that would disallow foreign tax credits for certain types of 
transactions if profit was “insubstantial” compared to expected foreign tax credits). 
 211.  Section 7701(o)’s legislative history describes a difference between cases that require more 
than nominal profit and cases that suggest that nominal profit is sufficient.  It cites, as belonging to the 
first group of cases, Goldstein v. Comm’r, 364 F.2d 734, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1966), and Sheldon v. Comm’r, 
94 T.C. 738, 768 (1990) (finding that profit was insufficient when the “potential for gain . . . is 
infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered in comparison with the claimed 
deductions”).  In contrast, it cites Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 1985), 
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), and IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 
253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001), as belonging to the second type.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 294. 
 212.  Contrast suggestions by Joseph Bankman and Charlene Luke for contrary means of 
determining how much profit is sufficient to meet the economic substance test.  See Bankman, supra note 
26, at 26 (discussing potential use of absolute amount of profit); Charlene D. Luke, Risk, Return, and 
Economic Substance, 27 VA. TAX REV. 783, 785 (2008) (suggesting use of post-U.S.-tax-benefit profit).  
These approaches appear to be foreclosed now by Section 7701(o).  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1), (o)(2)(A). 
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consistency, although circuits are still able to interpret “substantial” 
differently from each other. 
 The imposition of the “substantial” standard raises the question of 
whether courts or the Treasury, by guidance, can ever require a higher 
amount than “substantial” profit to meet the objective test.  For example, can 
courts look to the absolute amount of profit, in addition to the ratio of profit 
to tax benefits?  As is the case with the requirement that both prongs be met, 
the ratio test is literally phrased as a minimum rather than an exclusive 
standard.  The statute says that profit potential is taken into account “only if” 
(not “if and only if”) it meets the ratio test.  The statutory phrasing therefore 
technically leaves open the possibility that courts or the Treasury could 
decide that even more than the ratio test (i.e., more than “substantial in 
relation to expected tax benefits”) is required in order to take profit potential 
into account or to find that the transaction has sufficient economic substance.  
However, neither the courts nor the Treasury could provide an interpretation 
that takes profit potential into account for the two prongs where reasonably 
expected profit fails to meet the ratio standard.  The ratio test thus establishes 
a minimum standard, without necessarily precluding higher requirements 
from the courts or from Treasury guidance.   
 Although it is technically possible that the courts or Treasury guidance 
could require more profit than the ratio test’s minimum standard before 
taking profit into account, there are other alternatives to accomplish the same 
result.  The government could instead argue that profit, even if taken into 
account, does not automatically constitute either a “meaningful” change in 
economic position or a “substantial” business purpose, and that facts and 
circumstances must be examined to determine whether such profit satisfies 
either or both of the two prongs.  Meaningful change and substantial business 
purpose may be the more likely avenues for dispute, because the ratio test is 
only the standard for whether profit potential is “taken into account,” while 
meaningful change and substantial purpose are the tests for actually meeting 
the objective and subjective prongs, respectively.213   
 Section 7701(o) does not define “substantial” for purposes of 
comparing profit to tax benefits under the ratio test.  The Treasury could 
provide a definition (or parameters) in guidance.  Unless and until that 
happens, courts can interpret the term.  In the absence of administrative or 
judicial interpretations, taxpayers presumably will look to the ratios 
described in the examples of former Notice 98-5, which used similar 
 
 213.  See id. (profit ratio test); I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(1)(A) (“meaningful” change, for the objective 
prong), 7701(o)(1)(B) (“substantial” business purpose for the subjective prong). 
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terminology regarding expected profit that is “insubstantial compared to” tax 
benefits.214  Taxpayers may also examine the ratios in the Compaq215 and 
IES216 cases, which decided that their respective taxpayers had reasonably 
expected profit that was sufficient to meet the objective prong. 
 Potentially, “substantial” profit in relation to tax benefits, like 
meaningful change, could vary based on the facts and circumstances or on 
the intent of the particular statute that creates the challenged tax benefit.  In 
the latter case, “substantial” might differ for different tax benefits (e.g., 
foreign tax credits versus interest deductions). 
 Further, the courts or the Treasury might allow “substantial” to vary 
based on industry, e.g., for oil drilling versus lending.  The idea of adjusting 
the amount of profit required, i.e., how much is substantial, based on industry 
norms does not appear in Section 7701(o).  However, courts and the Treasury 
(by guidance) appear able to decide that Section 7701(o)’s undefined terms 
(substantial, meaningful, etc.) can have slightly different meanings or 
calibrations based on industry standards—this doesn’t seem to be precluded 
by the statute.  That would be consistent with case law, which says that the 
amount of reasonably expected profit that is sufficient to meet the objective 
prong varies depending on the standards and practice of the relevant 
industry.217  This case law concept about industry generally emphasizes the 
varying amounts of risk in different types of businesses.218   
 
E. Treatment of Foreign, State, Local, and Non-Income Federal Taxes  
 
1. In General 
 
 Taxes other than Federal income taxes are potentially relevant to the 
economic substance analysis (as modified by Section 7701(o)) at various 
different points. First, both “changes in a meaningful way . . . the taxpayer’s 
economic position” (for the objective prong) and “substantial purpose” (for 
the subjective prong) are computed “apart from Federal income tax effects.” 
 
 214.  See I.R.S. Notice 98-5 (withdrawn).  The ratios in the notice’s examples were 33:1, 12:1, and 
8:1.  The taxpayer in Pritired argued that its profit-to-credit ratio was better than the ratios listed in Notice 
98-5, and that it therefore met the objective prong by showing sufficient profit.  See Pritired, 816 F. Supp. 
2d at 729.  The Pritired court rejected this argument.  Id. at 741. 
 215.  See Compaq, 277 F.3d at 786. 
 216.  See IES, 253 F.3d at 352. 
 217.  See, e.g., Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 989–91 (1987); Jacobson v. Comm’r, 915 F.2d 832, 
838 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 218.  For example, the Jacobson court said that the movie industry generally involves more risk than 
some other businesses.  See Jacobson, 915 F.2d at 838.  
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This leaves the question of how other (non-Federal or non-income) taxes are 
taken into account (or ignored).  Next, there’s an issue as to which tax effects 
are excluded in computing “pre-tax” profit for purposes of the profit ratio 
test.  Lastly, the ratio test uses expected net tax benefits as the comparison to 
profit. 
 Federal income taxes are clearly excluded from the computation of pre-
tax profit, meaningful change in economic position, and substantial non-tax 
purpose.  But other potentially relevant tax effects include foreign, state, and 
local taxes, as well as non-income Federal taxes, and their treatment is less 
clear.  The issue arises for both tax benefits and tax costs of all taxes other 
than Federal income taxes.  Can such tax benefits constitute profit, 
meaningful change in economic position, or a non-tax purpose?  Can such 
tax costs reduce profit, impact the analysis of meaningful change, and 
decrease the ability to show a non-tax purpose?  Can such costs or benefits 
contribute to the net tax benefit used as a comparison in the ratio test? 
 Section 7701(o) contains a special rule for state and local taxes:  State 
and local tax effects that are “related to” Federal income tax effects are 
treated the same way as Federal income tax effects219 and therefore are not 
taken into account for the objective and subjective prongs.  By negative 
inference, state and local tax effects that are not so related presumably are 
taken into account for these purposes.  The rule for state and local taxes 
applies for purposes of paragraph (1) of Section 7701(o), which lists the two 
prongs.220  The references to pre-tax profit appear in paragraph (2) (in the 
profit ratio test and in rules relating to fees, other transaction expenses, and 
foreign taxes).221  One could argue that the rule for state and local taxes, and 
its negative inference, also apply to “pre-tax profit” (as that term is used in 
paragraph (2)), because paragraph (2) functions only to provide rules for 
purposes of paragraph (1) (and the state and local tax rule applies to 
paragraph (1)).222  Or one could alternatively contend that the rule (and 
negative inference) regarding state and local taxes do not affect “pre-tax 
profit,” and that such rule could have explicitly applied for purposes of all of 
the provisions of Section 7701(o) if Congress had intended that meaning.  
Thus, treatment of state and local taxes other than for purposes of paragraph 
(1)’s rules on meaningful change and substantial purpose is unclear enough 
 
 219.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(3).  The rule is captioned “State and Local Tax Benefits” (emphasis 
added), but its text refers to “any . . . tax effect” and it therefore appears to apply to tax costs as well as 
benefits. 
 220.  See I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(3), (o)(1). 
 221.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2). 
 222.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).   
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to leave room for administrative or judicial interpretation.   
 The treatment of foreign tax effects and Federal non-income tax effects 
is even less clear.  Both appear to be included in the evaluation of meaningful 
change in economic position and the analysis of non-tax purpose (the two 
prongs), which exclude only Federal income tax effects and related state and 
local tax effects.223  But the ratio rule that governs whether profit can be taken 
into account for the two prongs refers to “pre-tax profit.”224  It does not say 
whether “pre-tax” means only “pre-U.S. Federal income tax,” or also “pre-
Federal excise tax” and “pre-foreign tax.”225  
 The treatment of non-income Federal taxes is not directly mentioned in 
Section 7701(o).  Reading the statutory language literally, costs and benefits 
relating to such taxes appear to be included in evaluating meaningful change 
in economic position and substantial business purpose (both of which 
exclude only “Federal income tax effects”).226  But such non-income-tax 
effects appear to be technically excluded from “pre-tax profit,” until 
guidance (or the courts) define “pre-tax” as referring only to income taxes. 
 
2. Treatment of Foreign Taxes as Costs in Computing 
Profit 
 
 In contrast, Section 7701(o) requires the Treasury to issue guidance that 
treats foreign taxes as costs for the computation of pre-tax profit, “in 
appropriate cases.”227  (The House version of Section 7701(o) required that 
 
 223.  See Part 2, infra, for the disputed treatment of foreign taxes as a cost in computing profit, under 
pre-codification case law.  The literal language of section 7701(o)’s objective and subjective prongs 
includes foreign tax effects in the analysis of meaningful change in economic position and of substantial 
purpose, respectively: Such change and purpose are determined “apart from Federal income tax effects,” 
not apart from all tax effects.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (B).  That inclusion likely is not modified by 
the requirement that the Treasury issue regulations with respect to the treatment of foreign taxes as a cost 
in computing pre-tax profit, unless and until such guidance is issued.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A).  The 
IRS, however, appears to have a different interpretation: Notice 2010-62 states that the statute does not 
restrict the courts’ ability to consider such treatment of foreign taxes as a cost.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-
62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (“The Treasury Department and the IRS intend to issue regulations pursuant to 
section 7701(o)(2)(B). In the interim, the enactment of the provision does not restrict the ability of the 
courts to consider the appropriate treatment of foreign taxes in economic substance cases.”). 
 224.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 225.  In contrast, Section 7701(o)(1)’s descriptions of the objective and subjective prongs both 
(unlike the profit ratio rule) refer to “Federal income tax.”  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B), compare 
I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 226.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (B). 
 227.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B).  However, Treasury does not appear to have the authority to make 
this guidance binding for individuals who are exempt from Section 7701(o)(1) (which requires and 
describes the two prongs) by reason of Section 7701(o)(5)(B) (exempting individuals not conducting the 
transaction as part of a trade or business or “for the production of income”).  Instead, the regulatory 
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foreign taxes be treated as expenses in computing profit,228 but that rule was 
changed in the conference version of the provision.)229  The treatment of 
foreign tax costs and benefits as decreasing and increasing (respectively) 
profit is relevant for both the objective and subjective prongs.230  There has 
been a long-running, contentious dispute about whether foreign taxes are a 
cost in computing profit, for purposes of applying the economic substance 
doctrine.231  The circuits are currently divided on this issue.232  The dispute 
on this issue in the pre-Section-7701(o) case law relates to claims for foreign 
tax credits (credits against U.S. tax for foreign taxes paid or accrued).233  
However, the issue (and section 7701(o)’s requirement that the Treasury 
publish guidance) are not limited to cases where foreign tax credits are the 
challenged tax benefit.   
 The Treasury has not yet issued the required guidance on the 
treatment of foreign taxes in computing pre-tax profit for purposes of 
applying the economic substance doctrine.234  Until guidance is published, 
the issue is left to the courts, except as constrained by the statutory language.  
By not issuing guidance on this topic, the IRS risks a court’s making a broad 
statement that foreign taxes are never treated as a cost, as IES235 and 
Compaq236 appeared to do.237  Such a risk assumes that the courts have the 
 
authority is tied to the ratio test, which is only applicable for I.R.C. section 7701(o)(1).  See I.R.C. § 
7701(o)(2)(A), (B). 
 228.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 298 (“Fees and other transaction expenses and foreign taxes shall 
be taken into account as expenses in determining pre-tax profit.”). 
 229.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 230.  See I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(1)(A), (B) (objective and subjective prongs); 7701(o)(2)(B) (profit ratio 
test, implying that profit potential can affect both prongs).   
 231.  Compare Bank of N.Y. Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015), Santander, 844 F.3d 15, 
24 (1st Cir. 2016), and Salem II, 786 F.3d 932, 951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015), with Compaq Computer Corp. 
v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 2001), and IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354 
(8th Cir. 2001).  See also Rosenberg, STARS Wars, supra note 68, at 194–218 (discussing the controversy 
surrounding the treatment of foreign taxes for purposes of the economic substance test’s consideration of 
profit).   
 232.  Compare Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), and IES Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001), with Bank of N.Y. Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 
2015), Santander, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2016), and Salem II, 786 F.3d 932, 951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
See also Rosenberg, STARS Wars, supra note 68, at 194–218. 
 233.  See Compaq, 277 F.3d at 782; IES, 253 F.3d at 354; BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 
2015); Santander, 844 F.3d at 24; Salem II, 786 F.3d at 951, 960. 
 234.  See supra note 223. 
 235.  See IES, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 236.  See Compaq, 277 F.3d 778, 784–86 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 237.  However, the Special Master in the Wells Fargo litigation suggested that the IES holding might 
be distinguishable based on its facts.  See Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 99111, *43-
46; Wells Fargo & Co. v. U.S., 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 163955, *27-28, *32-33. 
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power to make such a decision, despite the statutory language that excludes 
only “Federal income tax effects” (and related state and local tax effects)—
not foreign tax effects—from the application of the objective and subjective 
prongs.238  Section 7701(o) analyzes both change in economic position (for 
the objective prong) and substantial purpose (for the subjective prong) “apart 
from Federal income tax effects.”239  That statutory phrasing implies that 
foreign tax effects are taken into account, unless and until the Treasury 
issues guidance on the treatment of foreign costs.240  Therefore, it is not clear 
that the courts can treat foreign taxes the same way as federal income tax 
effects for purposes of section 7701(o)’s two prongs (including the 
determination of pre-tax profit for the purposes of applying such two 
prongs), in the absence of Treasury guidance.  The IRS, however, appears to 
have a different interpretation: Notice 2010-62 states that section 7701(o) 
“does not restrict the ability of the courts” to consider such treatment of 
foreign taxes as a cost.241   
 Currently, the circuits are split on the question of whether foreign 
taxes are treated as a cost in applying the economic substance doctrine to 
foreign tax credit claims.242  As the case law presently stands, three circuits 
have held that foreign taxes are treated as a cost in computing profit for 
purposes of the economic substance analysis,243 two circuits have held to the 
contrary,244 and the remaining circuits have not spoken on the issue.  There 
is thus a split between the circuits, and a lack of precedent in some courts. It 
is not clear whether the answer could differ (in any circuit) for claims relating 
to other kinds of federal tax benefits.   
 
 238.  See I.R.C. §7701(o)(1), (3). 
 239.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (B); see also supra note 223.   
 240.  The special rule for state and local income tax effects that are “related to a Federal income tax 
effect,” and that are treated the same as federal income tax effects for purposes of the two prongs, creates 
a further negative inference that foreign income  tax effects are not so treated (in the absence of Treasury 
guidance).  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(3).  The legislative history contains “no inference” language regarding 
the treatment of foreign taxes as costs for pre-7701(o) periods.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 298 (“No 
inference is intended as to the proper application of the economic substance doctrine under present law.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 155 (same).   
 241.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411. 
 242.  Compare Compaq, 277 F.3d at 782 (foreign taxes are not a cost when computing profit for 
purposes of the economic substance test), and IES (same), with BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104,116 (2d Cir. 
2015) (foreign taxes are treated as an expense when computing profit for purposes of the economic 
substance doctrine), Santander, 844 F.3d at 23 (same), and Salem II, 786 F.3d at 949 (same).  The Wells 
Fargo decision (one of the STARS cases) has been appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which decided the IES 
case.  See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017). 
 243.  See BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015); Salem II, 786 F.3d at 951, 960; 
Santander, 844 F.3d at 23–24. 
 244.  See Compaq, 277 F.3d 778, 784–86 (5th Cir. 2001); IES, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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 Section 7701(o) also raises the issue of whether and how the courts 
might take into account the Treasury’s failure to issue the congressionally 
mandated regulations, e.g., through a theory that the agency cannot frustrate 
congressional intent by choosing not to act.245  Taxpayers could potentially 
argue that the absence of guidance that the statute has required affects the 
answer as to whether foreign taxes are treated as a cost.  For example, in 
circuits where pre-Section-7701(o) case law treats foreign taxes as a cost in 
the economic substance analysis,246 taxpayers might prefer IRS guidance to 
the status quo.  Such taxpayers might argue that Section 7701(o) requires the 
Treasury to restrict such treatment of foreign tax expenses to “appropriate 
cases,”247 i.e., to less than all cases.  Taxpayers in such situations could  
further assert that Treasury must issue such guidance, or that the courts must 
apply a less-than-all-circumstances rule for treating foreign taxes as an 
expense, if Treasury frustrates congressional intent by failing to act).  
However, Section 7701(o) also does not say what the content of the IRS 
guidance should be, unlike some other situations in which courts have faulted 
the agency for not issuing required guidance.248 
Notice 2010-62 states that the IRS and the Treasury “intend to issue 
regulations” under section 7701(o)’s regulatory authority regarding foreign 
taxes249—but they have not done so. However, the government has 
repeatedly argued in court that foreign taxes should be treated as a cost in the 
economic substance analysis,250 despite its failure to issue guidance 
consistent with its litigation position.  Why does the Treasury think this is 
the right rule to be implemented by the courts as precedent, but not correct 
enough to issue guidance on?  There are at least two possible explanations.  
First, at a practical, mechanical level, often the litigating agency in federal  
economic substance cases is the Department of Justice rather than the IRS 
 
 245.  Cf. Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997); American Air Liquide, Inc. & Subs. 
v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 23 (2001); see also generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Substance over Form: Phantom 
Regulations and the Internal Revenue Code, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 42 (2006) (discussing the legal 
impact of Treasury’s failure to issue congressionally mandated or allowed regulations in various 
situations).  Section 7701(o) states that the Secretary of the Treasury “shall” issue regulations regarding 
the treatment of foreign taxes.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 246.  See BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015); Salem II, 786 F.3d at 951, 960; 
Santander, 844 F.3d at 23–24. 
 247.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
 248.  See, e.g., Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997); American Air Liquide, Inc. 
& Subs. v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 23 (2001). 
 249.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411; see also generally Rosenberg, Codification, 
supra note 109. 
 250.  See, e.g., Compaq, 277 F.3d at 784–85; IES, 253 F. 3d 354; BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 118 
(2d Cir. 2015); Salem II, 786 F.3d at 951, 960; Santander, 844 F.3d at 23–24. 
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(which is part of the Treasury Department)—that is the case everywhere 
except in Tax Court.  Therefore, the government’s litigation positions are not 
always identical to the IRS’s willingness to issue regulations on a topic.  But 
the IRS did argue that foreign taxes should be treated as expenses (in 
computing profit for purposes of the economic substance test) in the Tax 
Court in both Compaq251 and Bank of New York Mellon v. Commissioner.252  
As a second explanation for the lack of guidance on the treatment of 
foreign taxes (even though the IRS is willing to take litigation positions on 
the issue), the IRS may be facing a shortage of time and personnel.  Even 
before the recent changes made by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,253 the IRS was 
under pressure to issue many other types of foreign tax credit guidance (in 
addition to this treatment-as-an-expense issue): There were several new 
foreign tax credit rules enacted in 2010, in the same legislative package as 
Section 7701(o).254  Additional foreign tax credit changes were enacted at 
the end of 2017.255  However, there are large dollar amounts at stake in the 
economic substance cases,256 which might have been expected to get the 
foreign-taxes-as-an-expense issue some priority.   
On a technical level, it is also possible that the Treasury thinks that 
foreign taxes are appropriately treated as costs in some cases but not others, 
and has not yet decided which circumstances are which.  For example, the 
Treasury might consider whether different rules (regarding the treatment of 
foreign taxes as an expense) should apply where foreign tax credits are not 
the challenged tax benefit (e.g., if the IRS is challenging an interest 
deduction or other benefit, but the taxpayer also has foreign tax expenses).  
Section 7701(o) itself implies that treating foreign taxes as a cost might not 
be the rule in all cases, after the Treasury issues guidance.257  But 
presumably, while it considers the possible exceptions, the Treasury could 
 
 251.  See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 214, 222–23 (1999), rev’d by 277 F.3d 778 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
 252.  See Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm'r, 140 T.C. 15, 35 (2015), aff’d 801 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 
2015), cert. denied 136 S.Ct. 1377 (2016). 
 253.  See An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution 
on the budget for fiscal year 2018 (commonly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act), Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 254.  See I.R.C. §§ 901(m), 904(d)(6), 909, 960(c). 
 255.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 960(a), (d). 
 256.  For example, the STARS cases involved hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign tax credits, 
although they occurred before Section 7701(o)’s effective date.  See BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 112 
(2d Cir. 2015); Santander, 844 F.3d at 17; Salem II, 786 F.3d at 936; Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 
143 F. Supp. 3d 827, 831 (D. MN. 2015). 
 257.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B) (“in appropriate cases”). 
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issue guidance stating that cost treatment applies in all cases until further 
guidance is issued (or the converse).  It has not done so. 
Especially given the dollar amounts at stake, isn’t it worth issuing 
guidance that says something to the effect of “foreign taxes are a cost (for 
purposes of determining profit under the economic substance test) unless the 
taxpayer proves to the IRS’s satisfaction that they are not appropriately 
treated as a cost under the facts and circumstances of a particular 
transaction”?  Could an insufficiently nuanced regulatory rule that generally 
treats foreign taxes as a cost really be worse than current Fifth and Eighth 
Circuit precedents that arguably say that foreign taxes are never a cost?258  
Those court holdings appear clearly the wrong answer259 and are also very 
costly for the U.S. Treasury.  It seems that the prudent move would be for 
the Treasury to issue regulations consistent with the government’s litigating 
position, or (at least) regulations stating that the default rule is that foreign 
taxes are treated as costs, unless the taxpayer persuades the IRS that a 
contrary answer is more appropriate under the facts and circumstances. 
 
F. Determining when the Economic Substance Doctrine is Relevant 
 
Relevance is essentially a preliminary step for determining whether the 
economic substance analysis applies to a transaction at all.260  If the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, then the objective and subjective 
prongs (and the rest of the economic substance doctrine) can be applied to 
determine whether the transaction passes or fails the economic substance test 
(i.e., whether it has sufficient economic substance to be respected).261  A 
finding that the doctrine is relevant to a transaction (i.e., the transaction is 
not exempt from economic substance inquiry) does not determine the 
outcome of the economic substance analysis, and does not necessarily mean 
that the transaction will be disregarded for federal income tax purposes.262  
Conversely, however, a finding that the economic substance doctrine is not 
relevant to a particular tax benefit (e.g., perhaps low income housing credits) 
 
 258.  See Compaq, 277 F.3d 778, 784–86 (5th Cir. 2001); IES, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 259.  See generally Rosenberg, STARS Wars, supra note 68. 
 260.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1). 
 261.  See I.R.C. §7701(o). 
 262.  See, e.g., UPS of America v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a 
reinsurance transaction passed the economic substance test and should be respected); Compaq Computer 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781–82 (5th Cir. 2001) (economic substance doctrine was applied to the 
transaction, but taxpayer prevailed in its arguments that the two prongs of the test were met); IES Indus., 
Inc., v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 2001) (same). 
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is the end of the inquiry, and prevents the two prongs (and the rest of the 
doctrine) from being applied or analyzed.263 
The courts have traditionally determined that the economic substance 
test does not apply—and therefore the conjunctive, disjunctive, or other 
formulation of the analysis is not performed—if Congress did not intend the 
doctrine to pertain to the particular tax benefit (e.g., a specific credit or 
deduction) at issue.264  For example, the low income housing credit arguably 
is intended to be granted even in non-economic transactions.265  Courts have 
differed in the past on their determinations of which tax benefits are subject 
to the economic substance doctrine and which are not.  For example, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the allowance 
of a loss on straddle transactions for commodities dealers, under Section 108, 
was not subject to the economic substance doctrine.266  It found that Congress 
had preempted and foreclosed an economic substance analysis on this issue 
because the statutory language irrefutably presumed that such losses of 
commodities dealers (but not of other taxpayers) were incurred in the course 
of a trade or business.267  The relevant statute, Section 108, required that the 
transaction either be engaged in for profit or connected with a trade or 
business.268  The court focused on congressional intent.269  However, two 
other circuit courts reviewed the same Tax Court decision but reached the 
opposite conclusion from the D.C. Circuit.270  Section 7701(o) does not 
 
 263.  See BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2015); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 
469 (1935).  
 264.  See, e.g., Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 498–99 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that the statutory 
language of Section 165(c) “can be viewed as codifying the economic substance doctrine for loss 
deductions, thus placing it beyond the power of judicial reexamination”); Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F. 2d 
1229, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (losses of commodities dealers under section 108 are not subject to an 
economic substance analysis); see also Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir.1995) (“The tax 
credits were intended to generate investments in alternative energy technologies that would not otherwise 
be made because of their low profitability”); Casebeer v. Comm’r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 265.  See I.R.C. §7701(o); cf. Steven A. Dean, Space Madness: Subsidies and Economic Substance, 
99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 151, 153 (2014) (suggesting adaptations to the manner in which the 
economic substance doctrine applies, or does not apply, to tax subsidies that are intended to encourage 
non-economic behavior). 
 266.  See Horn, 968 F.2d at 1239. 
 267.  Id.  
 268.  Id. at 1238. 
 269.  Id. at 1239–40. 
 270.  See Gardner v. Comm’r, 954 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1992); Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 
54–55 (3d Cir.); see also Massey v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (table) (reviewing 
the same tax court opinion as Horn, Gardner, and Lerman, and upholding the tax court’s decision without 
writing an appellate opinion, so the issue of whether economic substance applies to the disputed section 
108 deduction was not discussed).   
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preclude similar lack of uniformity among the circuits in the future, 
regarding whether or not the economic substance doctrine applies. 
The IRS does not have the authority to issue guidance defining 
relevance.  Section 7701(o) provides that “the determination of whether the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the 
same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”271  If Section 
7701(o) had never been enacted, the Treasury would have no regulatory 
authority to issue guidance about when the judicial doctrine of economic 
substance applies.  So, literally, there does not appear to be regulatory 
authority to address this issue.  Congress did not give a reason for preserving 
this determination for the courts alone, without the possibility of regulatory 
guidance.272  
Despite this lack of regulatory authority, taxpayers and practitioners 
asked the IRS to publish a list of transactions to which the economic 
substance doctrine does not apply or (conversely) an exclusive list of 
transactions to which economic substance does apply (to provide safety to 
everything else).273  Although the IRS does not appear to have the authority 
to issue such a list,274 no taxpayer would likely challenge the IRS’s 
regulatory authority if taxpayers felt that the guidance benefited them.  
Therefore, in the case of any taxpayer-favorable guidance regarding 
relevance, regulatory authority might be a moot point. 
The IRS has declined to issue formal guidance to taxpayers regarding 
relevance275 (which seems consistent with its lack of regulatory authority on 
this issue).  The agency has, however, issued instructions to its own 
examiners, concerning when the economic substance doctrine should be 
raised on audit and providing (arguably onerous) procedures for examiners 
 
 271.  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 272.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 295–296; Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 152; see also 
Rosenberg, Codification, supra note 109 (discussing the IRS’ issuing de facto guidance on relevance by 
means of an internal directive that restricts its agents’ ability to raise the doctrine); cf. also part III G, 
infra (discussing arguments that the Treasury may lack the authority to define the tested transaction).   
 273.  See, e.g., Firms Seek Codified Economic Substance Doctrine Guidance, 2015 TAX NEWS 
TODAY 23–30 (Feb. 2, 2015) (reprinting a letter from multiple practitioners to the Treasury Department); 
Practitioners Want More Specifics on Codified Economic Substance Doctrine, 2011 TAX NEWS TODAY 
86–89 (May 2, 2011) (reprinting a different letter from practitioners to the IRS and the Treasury 
Department); ABA Members Seek More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, 2011 
TAX NEWS TODAY 12–13 (Jan. 18, 2011) (reprinting joint comments prepared by the American Bar 
Association Section of Taxation and members of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); 
NYSBA Tax Section Recommends More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, 2011 
TAX NEWS TODAY 5–14 (Jan. 5, 2011) (reprinting a report by the New York State Bar Association Tax 
Section). 
 274.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 275.  See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  10:28 AM 
Winter 2019              CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 113 
 
 
to follow if such examiners choose to raise the issue.276  This internal 
guidance is available for the public to see, and (practically speaking) 
taxpayers are likely to take such internal rules into account when evaluating 
the IRS’s position.  Therefore, the IRS has (in effect) published rules that 
address when the economic substance doctrine should and should not be 
applied (closely related to relevance), even though it technically has no 
authority to issue guidance on relevance.  This raises many issues about the 
authority of the agency to frustrate the intent of Congress by issuing rules on 
a topic that was reserved to the courts.  It also raises issues about the 
appropriateness of issuing de facto, unofficial guidance by means of internal 
letters to agency employees.277   
The legislative history regarding Section 7701(o) does supply a non-
exclusive list of normal business transactions for which Section 7701(o) is 
not expected to change the tax treatment.  That list contains the following 
four types of transactions:  Taxpayer choices between the use of debt and 
equity; a United States person’s choice of the nationality (U.S. or foreign) of 
a corporation used to make a foreign investment; the choice to enter into a 
corporate organization or reorganization under Subchapter C of the Code; 
and the choice to conduct a transaction using a related entity (if Section 482’s 
arm’s length pricing requirements are met).278   
This list is not quite a description of when the economic substance 
doctrine is relevant (although some commentators and taxpayers would like 
to interpret it that way).279  Instead, this is merely a statement that Section 
7701(o) is not expected to change the application (or non-application) of the 
economic substance doctrine to such transactions.  To read the list of 
transactions as expressing congressional intent about relevance would 
conflict with the statutory language that directly states that relevance is to be 
determined “as if this subsection had never been enacted.”280  Such a reading 
would be inconsistent with the general rule of statutory interpretation that 
clear statutory language (e.g., Section 7701(o)’s statement that relevance is 
 
 276.  See LB&I Directive, LMSB Directive, supra note 20; see generally Rosenberg, Codification, 
supra note 109. 
 277.  See generally Rosenberg, Codification, supra note 109; Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 1841, 1841 (2011) (not focusing on the IRS, but stating generally that “Over the last two decades, 
agencies have increasingly favored the use of . . . statements of best practices, interpretative guides, 
private warning letters, and press releases”). 
 278.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 296; Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 152–53.   
 279.  See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 70, at 331 (“an important issue is the scope of the ‘angel list’ 
included in the legislative history. . . .  This non-exclusive list . . . implies that many common tax planning 
techniques will be respected.”). 
 280.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
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left to the courts to decide) overrides any legislative history statement to the 
contrary.281   
Taxpayers may argue, nonetheless, that Congress did not intend the 
economic substance doctrine (as impacted by Section 7701(o)) to apply to 
the enumerated transactions in the legislative history or to other 
commonplace business choices.282  They could further argue that the 
economic substance doctrine focuses on implementing congressional intent, 
so that the intent expressed in the House and Joint Committee Reports should 
affect courts’ determinations of the doctrine’s relevance to such transactions.  
This argument does not seem compelling in the face of the statute’s clearly 
leaving the relevance determination to the courts.283  Further, the four listed 
transactions in the House and Joint Committee reports appear immediately 
after a paragraph in which those reports explain that the issue of relevance is 
left to the courts and that “the provision does not change current law 
standards in determining when to utilize an economic substance analysis.”284   
However, even if Section 7701(o) does not prevent the application of 
the economic substance doctrine to the four listed transactions, courts have 
often (before section 7701(o)) decided not to apply the economic substance 
doctrine to such choices, on the grounds that Congress intended to allow 
taxpayers to make some decisions (e.g., the choice between debt and equity) 
based on tax consequences.285  Under Section 7701(o), courts can continue 
to determine that the economic substance doctrine was not intended to apply 
to particular tax benefits.  The legislative history appears to emphasize that 
the essential question in making such determination is whether the claimed 
tax benefit is consistent with congressional intent.286 
 
 281.  See Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 549, 576 (Ct. Cl. 2015), 
aff’d 797 F.3d 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g den’d 805 F.3d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. den’d 136 S. Ct. 
1659 (2016); see also supra note 14. 
 282.  See Lipton, supra note 279. 
 283.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 284.  H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, at 295–96; see also Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 152 
(using almost identical language). 
 285.  See, e.g., Kraft Foods v. Comm’r, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956); Esmark, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 
T.C. 171 (1988), aff’d 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).  The list of four transactions may represent 
Congress’ understanding of the case law (as of the time of enactment) with respect to these transactions, 
without preventing the courts from adapting and refining the case law over time. 
 286.  See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 296 n.129 (emphasis added): 
If the tax benefits are clearly consistent with all applicable provisions of the Code and the 
purposes of such provisions, it is not intended that such tax benefits be disallowed if the only 
reason for such disallowance is that the transaction fails the economic substance doctrine as 
defined in this provision.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.269-2, stating that characteristic of 
circumstances in which a deduction otherwise allowed will be disallowed are those in which 
the effect of the deduction, credit, or other allowance would be to distort the liability of the 
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G. Codification Does Not Have Much Effect on Definition of the 
Transaction to be Tested 
 
Historically, one key question in economic substance cases has been 
how to define the transaction to be tested (i.e., how to describe the set of the 
taxpayer’s steps or actions to which the two prongs, or other formulation of 
the test, should be applied).287  Section 7701(o) uses the term “transaction” 
to describe the tested set of activities.288  The delineation of the transaction 
can determine the outcome of the economic substance analysis by including 
or excluding positive elements (e.g., elements with profit potential or 
business purpose).289  Imagine, for example, that the only step that has profit 
potential or business purpose is separated, for purposes of applying the two 
prongs, from the three steps that create the claimed tax benefit. 
Pre-Section-7701(o) case law generally held that the transaction that is 
to be tested consists of the steps that were necessary to generate the 
challenged tax benefit.290  Section 7701(o) says only that the transaction to 
be tested “includes a series of transactions.”291  This is not a full description 
of what “transaction” means or doesn’t mean, only a note about what a 
transaction “includes.”  
 
particular taxpayer when the essential nature of the transaction or situation is examined in the 
light of the basic purpose or plan which the deduction, credit, or other allowance was 
designed by the Congress to effectuate.  
 287.  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1998); Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 
91–92 (4th Cir. 1985); IES, 253 F3d at 353; Alessandra v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2768 (1995); see 
also Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing whether a loan 
and trust should be tested together or separately for economic substance).  For example, many cases have 
held that challenged transactions are tested separately from the related borrowing (if the interest 
deductions from such borrowing are not the focus of the transaction).  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d at 262; 
Rice’s Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91–92; Salem II, 786 F.3d at 960.   
 288.  The term “transaction” is used throughout Section 7701(o) to indicate the set of steps or actions 
that are being tested, i.e., the set of items to which the relevance inquiry, the objective and subjective 
prongs, and the profit ratio test apply.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1), (2)(A), (5)(C). 
 289.  See generally David P. Hariton, The Frame Game: How Defining the “Transaction” Decides 
the Case, 63 TAX LAW 1 (2009) (discussing the importance of determining the arrangement to be tested); 
see also Bankman, supra note 26, at 15 (defining the tested steps can determine the outcome of the 
economic substance analysis). 
 290.  See infra notes 294 and 300; see also generally Rosenberg, STARS Wars, supra note 68, at 
191–93.  Section 7701(o)’s legislative history somewhat confusingly states that “some courts have 
bifurcated a transaction in which activities with non-tax objectives have been combined with unrelated 
activities having only tax-avoidance objectives, in order to disallow the tax benefits of the overall 
transaction.”  H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 292.  It isn’t clear why this House Report refers to disallowing 
benefits from the overall transaction rather than disallowing benefits from the tax-motivated steps, which 
have been isolated from the remaining steps for the purposes of the economic substance analysis.  
 291.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D). 
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The statute does not specifically state the converse possibility that 
“transaction” can mean one portion of a larger transaction, but neither does 
it forbid that approach.  (The legislative history, in contrast, says that the 
provision “reiterates the present-law ability of the courts to bifurcate a 
transaction.”)292  Thus, if multiple parts of a transaction each constitute a 
transaction themselves (e.g., a loan and an investment) then Section 
7701(o)’s partial definition seems to allow either treating each such portion 
as a separate transaction or grouping them together as one larger tested 
transaction, depending on the facts and circumstances.   
The legislative history says that Section 7701(o) does not change the 
ability of the courts to aggregate or disaggregate a transaction in order to 
determine the unit to be tested.293  Indeed, Section 7701(o)’s definition of 
“transaction” appears to allow the continued application of the pre-Section-
7701(o) case law’s approach, which has combined or disaggregated steps or 
transactions in order to delineate the tested items, with the goal of testing 
together the parts of the transaction(s) necessary for the tax benefit.294  
Section 7701(o)’s definition of “transaction” seems just meant to confirm 
that codification doesn’t change the current judicial practice of defining the 
tested transaction on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each situation.295  This intent is explained in Section 
7701(o)’s legislative history.296  This interpretation is also supported by 
“[t]he normal rule of statutory construction . . . that if Congress intends for 
 
 292.  See infra note 293. 
 293.  According to the legislative history: 
The provision does not alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise 
recharacterize a transaction when applying the [economic substance] doctrine.  For example, 
the provision reiterates the present-law ability of the courts to bifurcate a transaction in which 
independent activities with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having 
only tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated benefits. 
H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, 296–97; see also Joint Committee Report, supra note 65, at 153 (same).  Notice 
2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746, cites the above language before purporting to give some (broad) standards 
for how to aggregate or disaggregate steps to determine the tested transaction.   
 294.  See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2015); Salem II, 786 F.3d 932, 
951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Santander, 844 F.3d 15, 21–2 (1st Cir. 2016); Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 
752 F.2d 89, 91–2 (4th Cir. 1985); ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 247–48 (3d Cir. 1998); Coltec Indus. v. United 
States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 754–55 (2004), rev’d by Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1352–54 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (testing separately the transaction that resulted in the challenged tax benefit and rejecting 
the lower court’s approach of defining the tested transaction more broadly), reh’g denied, Coltec Indus., 
Inc. v. United States, No. 05-5111, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24771 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 19, 2006), cert. denied 
549 U.S. 1206 (2007); see also infra note 300. 
 295.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d at 112-13 (applying economic substance doctrine to facts 
arising before Section 7701(o)’s effective date). 
 296.  See supra note 293. 
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legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it 
makes that intent specific.”297 
However, commentators have speculated,298 and practitioners have 
worried, that Section 7701(o)’s definition of “transaction” expands the 
courts’ and Treasury’s ability to aggregate and disaggregate in order to 
define the arrangement (steps or portions of steps) to be tested.  In particular, 
commentators worried that Congress enhanced the ability to aggregate or to 
instead separate steps of a single transaction (or multiple related 
transactions) in order to reach a taxpayer-unfavorable result.299  This concern 
about a change in the definition of “transaction” seems unfounded, given the 
limited nature of Section 7701(o)’s definition of the “transaction” and the 
consistency of that description with the pre-existing case law, which is 
confirmed by the legislative history.   
Under the pre-Section 7701(o) economic substance case law, the courts 
and government already had the ability to define the tested transaction by 
grouping and breaking apart various steps, and they generally focused on 
which steps were necessary to claim the challenged tax benefit and which 
steps were integrally connected to each other.300  This delineation of the 
 
 297.  Midatlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envt’l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) 
(quoting Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1979)). 
 298.  See, e.g., Bret Wells, Economic Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes Decided 
Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411, 422–23 (2010) (discussing the impact of Section 7701(o) on the 
determination of the transaction to be tested under the economic substance doctrine and theorizing that 
the statute changes the courts’ ability to aggregate and disaggregate steps in order to define the tested 
transaction).  
 299.  See id. 
 300.  See, e.g., BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d 104, 121, 123–124 (2d. Cir. 2015) (“The loan was not 
necessary for the STARS structure to produce the disallowed foreign tax credits.”) (citation omitted); 
ACM, 157 F.3d 231, 260 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The Tax Court properly analyzed the profitability of the 
transactions whose economic substance is at issue, namely the contingent installment exchange of 
Citicorp notes for LIBOR notes which gave rise to the disputed tax consequences.”); Coltec Indus. v. 
United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“the transaction to be analyzed is the one that gave 
rise to the alleged tax benefit.”); id. at 1358 (“we must focus on the transaction that gave the taxpayer a 
high basis in the stock and thus gave rise to the alleged benefit upon sale. . . .  It is this exchange that 
provided Garlock with the high basis in the Garrison stock, this exchange whose tax consequence is in 
dispute, and therefore it is this exchange on which we must focus.”); Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm’r, 320 
F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2002); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 767 n.19 (1990); Long Term Capital 
Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 183 (D. Conn. 2004) (one “cannot avoid the requirements 
of economic substance simply by coupling a routine economic transaction generating substantial profits 
and with no inherent tax benefits to a unique transaction that otherwise has no hope of turning a profit”), 
aff’d 150 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order); Salem II, 786 F.3d 932, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(citing with approval Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-225, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 
367 (2013): “The court based its ruling in that case on the same factors that are present here: (1) the loan 
was not necessary for the STARS structure to produce the disallowed foreign tax credits; (2) the loan 
proceeds were not used to finance, secure, or carry out the STARS structure; and (3) the loan served a 
purpose beyond the creation of tax benefits.”); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 125–26 (3d Cir. 
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tested transaction was already, before Section 7701(o), a disputed point in 
litigation, as taxpayers argued for the most taxpayer-favorable inclusion of 
profitable steps in each case, and the courts tended to restrict the tested 
transaction to those steps connected with the asserted Federal income tax 
benefit.301  Section 7701(o) does not appear to have expanded or otherwise 
changed the courts’ ability to engage in this factual determination, except 
that it has arguably given the Treasury the ability to issue guidance on this 
topic (as discussed below). 
Treasury addressed the definition of “transaction” in Notice 2014-58—
but didn’t appear to say much.302  The notice states that the definition of the 
tested transaction can vary based on the facts and circumstances.303  It further 
indicates a possible approach of analyzing separately “tax-motivated steps 
that are not necessary to accomplish the non-tax goals.”304  The case law 
tends to express a very similar concept in the converse: delineating (by 
aggregation or separating out) the steps that are necessary to the claim of the 
disputed tax benefit.305  The notice’s discussion of the meaning of 
 
1994) (focusing on the part of the transaction that generated the tax benefits, “Wexler’s case differs in a 
critical respect.  There is no debt obligation that can be separated from the underlying repo scheme or that 
was undertaken for some reason other than the tax benefits of deducting interest on that obligation itself.  
The obligation that Wexler argues to be an economically substantive ‘genuine indebtedness’, the loan 
secured by the government securities, is the very obligation that will generate the interest payments 
constituting the tax benefits of the entire transaction.”); see also supra note 294, infra notes 301, 305. 
 301.  See, e.g., Rice’s Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91–92; ACM, 157 F.3d at 245; BNY Mellon II, 801 
F.3d at 106–107; Alessandra v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2768, *10-11 (1995); see also supra note 
300. 
 302.  See Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
 303.  IRS Notice 2014-58 states that: 
For purposes of determining whether the codified economic substance doctrine applies, 
“transaction” generally includes all the factual elements relevant to the expected tax treatment 
of any investment, entity, plan, or arrangement; and any or all of the steps that are carried out 
as part of a plan.  Facts and circumstances determine whether a plan’s steps are aggregated or 
disaggregated when defining a transaction. 
I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
 304.  The notice states that: 
Generally, when a plan that generated a tax benefit involves a series of interconnected steps 
with a common objective, the “transaction” includes all of the steps taken together—an 
aggregation approach . . . .  However, when a series of steps includes a tax-motivated step that 
is not necessary to achieve a non-tax objective, an aggregation approach may not be 
appropriate.  In that case, the “transaction” may include only the tax-motivated steps that are 
not necessary to accomplish the non-tax goals—a disaggregation approach. 
I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
 305.  See, e.g., ACM, 157 F.3d at 262–63, 256 n.48; BNY Mellon II, 801 F.3d at 121, 123–24; see 
also U.S. v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 125–26 (3rd Cir. 1994) (focusing on the part of the transaction that 
generated the tax benefits, “Wexler’s case differs in a critical respect.  There is no debt obligation that 
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“transaction” is thus largely consistent with the approach of the pre-Section 
7701(o) case law.  The notice, like the statute, does not appear to expand or 
otherwise change the courts’ ability to consider which steps should be tested 
together as one unit, or instead separated into discrete parts, under the 
economic substance doctrine.306   
The description of the tested transaction raises an interesting issue about 
the Treasury’s regulatory authority on this topic.  Initially, it appears that 
Section 7701(o)’s choice to include a definition of “transaction” gives the 
agency the ability to address and refine that definition, within the bounds of 
congressional intent.  Before Section 7701(o), courts had the sole authority 
over this determination, and the Treasury could not issue regulations 
regarding the arrangement to be tested under the judicial doctrine.307  
Although there is no specific grant of regulatory authority on the 
“transaction” definition, Section 7805 gives the Treasury general authority 
to issue guidance regarding Internal Revenue Code provisions.308 
However, the legislative history clearly states that Section 7701(o)’s 
definition of “transaction” does not alter the courts’ ability to aggregate or 
disaggregate in order to describe the tested transaction.309  This legislative 
history could be used to argue that Congress did not intend to grant 
regulatory authority to the Treasury to define the tested transaction, but 
instead meant to leave this determination to the courts (like the determination 
of relevance).310  But Congress did not choose to include statutory language 
that affirmatively keeps “transaction” the sole province of the courts, as it 
did for “relevance.”311  Instead, Congress relied on legislative history (a 
House Report as well as a description by the Joint Committee on Taxation312) 
 
can be separated from the underlying repo scheme or that was undertaken for some reason other than the 
tax benefits of deducting interest on that obligation itself.”); see also infra notes 294, 300. 
 306.  Query whether a notice could have such an impact in any event.  Notice 2014-58 quotes the 
legislative history that says that the courts’ ability to define “transactions” is unchanged.  See I.R.S. Notice 
2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746; see also supra note 293. 
 307.  The executive branch, in its capacity as litigator, always had some influence by choosing to 
assert particular arguments or not.  For example, the government could choose to concede that five steps 
should all be tested together.  But (before codification) the courts had the final say and were free to 
disagree with the litigating agency’s theory of how the tested transaction should be defined. 
 308.  See I.R.C. § 7805(a). 
 309.  See supra note 293. 
 310.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 311.  Compare I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D) (addressing the term “transaction”) with I.R.C. § 
7701(o)(5)(C) (addressing relevance). 
 312.  Descriptive reports by the Joint Committee on Taxation are not technically legislative history 
but are commonly considered as an indication of congressional intent or as an aid to understanding 
legislation.  Courts have varied in the weight that they give to such Joint Committee reports.  See Fed. 
Power Comm’n v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458, 472 (1973) (a Joint Committee on 
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rather than statutory language to express the unchanged powers of the courts 
regarding “transactions.”313   
Given the general priority of statutory language over legislative 
history,314 the Treasury arguably has the ability to issue guidance regarding 
aggregation or disaggregation of steps to define the tested transaction, 
despite the legislative history’s statement that the courts’ powers in this 
regard should be unchanged.  But the Treasury’s authority to issue guidance 
on this topic could be disputed.  This is especially the case because it is the 
absence of a prohibition on regulations, not an affirmative grant of 
 
Taxation explanation was a “compelling contemporary indication” of legislative intent); Fannie Mae v. 
United States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“as a post-enactment explanation, the Blue Book 
interpretation is entitled to little weight.”); Flood v. United States, 33 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Estate of Wallace v. Comm’r, 965 F.2d 1038, 1050 n.15 (11th Cir. 1992); McDonald v. Comm’r, 764 
F.2d 322, 336 n.25 (5th Cir. 1985); AD Global Fund, LLC v. U.S., 67 Fed. Cl. 657, 677 (2005) (explaining 
that Joint Committee explanations are prepared by staff, not legislators, and are often prepared after 
legislation is enacted (so that they do not represent materials that were available to and influenced 
legislators before a congressional vote), but that such explanations have nonetheless been viewed as 
informative by some courts, while being discounted by others). 
For Section 7701(o), the House Report was written before amendments by the Senate and before the 
final version of the statute was enacted, but the Joint Committee Report was written after enactment.  See 
H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, as reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.A.N.N. 123 (2010); Joint Committee Report, supra 
note 65, at 156 (2010).  The fact that the House and Joint Committee reports contain the same language 
regarding the unchanged ability of the courts to determine the “transaction” (see supra note 293) suggests 
that this thought survived the Conference Committee and still applies to the final, enacted version of 
Section 7701(o). 
 313.  At least one commentator has disparaged this particular legislative history, although his 
argument was that the House Report was not publicly quoted by the IRS or others soon enough after 
enactment and that it was a budget committee report rather than a conference committee report.  See Amy 
S. Elliott, Economic Substance Notice’s Sham Treatment Reverses LB&I Course, 2014 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 202–205 (Oct. 20, 2014) (“Cummings also pointed out that in extending the penalty to apply to 
sham transactions, the IRS cited the legislative history of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010.  That House report ‘has never before been cited by the United States government,’ 
Cummings said. ‘I’m not that comfortable relying on House reports that just got discovered last week.’”); 
Andrew Velarde, IRS Releases New Guidance on Economic Substance Doctrine, 145 TAX NOTES 174 
(Oct. 13, 2014) (“Cummings . . . said that the promotion of a budget act report, which is not a House 
conference report, to legislative history had hardly ever been done in any reported case decision before it 
appeared in the Chemtech litigation, and had never been cited in other IRS notices.”); see also Jasper L. 
Cummings, Jr., The Sham Transaction Doctrine, 145 TAX NOTES 1239 (Dec. 15, 2014) (referring to “the 
alleged legislative history, which was not a House conference report”); id. at n.149 (explaining that  
“H.R. Rep. No. 111-443 has never been cited by Treasury or the IRS. It has been cited in five court 
opinions . . . .  The report on the Budget Reconciliation Act bundled up the reports from the prior year, 
one of which was the Ways and Means Committee report on the section 7701(o) proposal.  See John 
Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act, 105 LAW LIB. J. 131 (2013).”). 
 314.  See, e.g., Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. U.S., 118 Fed. Cl. 549, 576 (2014), aff’d 797 F.3d 
1011 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g den’d 805 F.3d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. den’d 136 S. Ct. 1659 (2016); 
see also supra note 13. 
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specifically described regulatory authority,315 that arguably allows the 
agency to define “transactions,” in contradiction with the legislative 
history’s apparent intent to leave the “transaction” determination to the 
courts.  The “transaction” issue could lead to vigorous debate in the future 
regarding the relative power of legislative history to prevent regulatory 
guidance or to influence its content.   
The Treasury apparently believes that it has regulatory authority in this 
regard, because it addressed the definition of “transaction” in Notice 2015-
58.316  Although practitioners criticized the content, or lack thereof, in that 
notice,317  they apparently did not challenge the IRS’s authority to issue 
guidance on this topic.  That lack of challenge may stem from a preference 
for IRS guidance that is more favorable or predictable than judicial decisions.  
If the IRS were to issue guidance that disfavored a particular taxpayer’s 
arguments, one could expect a discussion of whether the legislative history 
nonetheless leaves this issue to the judiciary rather than the agency. 
Given the stated intent not to alter the courts’ ability to delineate the 
tested transaction, perhaps the only reasons to add a definition of 
“transaction” to the statute were to clarify that pre-enactment practice on this 
topic was not being changed, and to show that Congress approves of the 
courts’ current approach.  This might have been clearer if Congress had 
merely stated, as it did for relevance,318 that Section 7701(o) would not 
change the determination of the tested transaction.  It is not obvious why 
Congress chose different approaches for making possibly the same point for 
“relevance” and “transaction.”  
 
H. Section 7701(o) Constrains the Ability of Courts to Adapt the 
Doctrine 
 
 
 315.  The Treasury’s regulatory authority regarding the meaning of “transaction” derives from the 
general regulatory authority granted by section 7805, rather than from a subject-specific grant contained 
in section 7701(o) itself.  Compare I.R.C. § 7805(a) with I.R.C. §7701(o)(2)(B). 
 316.  Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
 317.  See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Troubled by Economic Substance Notice, 145 TAX 
NOTES 277 (Oct. 20, 2014) (practitioners criticized the notice’s description of “transactions”); Andrew 
Velarde, IRS Releases New Guidance on Economic Substance Doctrine, 145 TAX NOTES 174 (Oct. 13, 
2014) (practitioners negatively discussed the notice’s treatment of “transactions”); see also Firms Seek 
Codified Economic Substance Doctrine Guidance, 2015 TAX NEWS TODAY 23–30 (Feb. 2, 2015) 
(reprinting a letter from multiple practitioners to the IRS, which discussed the definition of “similar rule 
of law”); Amy S. Elliott, Economic Substance Notice’s Sham Treatment Reverses LB&I Course, 2014 
TAX NOTES TODAY 202–205 (Oct. 20, 2014) (practitioners expressed concern about the notice’s 
interpretation of “similar rule of law”). 
 318.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
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Among its other effects, Section 7701(o) constrains, without 
eliminating, the ability of the courts to adapt the economic substance doctrine 
over time, in order to respond to new fact patterns.319  Gradual evolution had 
been the previous pattern for the doctrine.320  The courts (rather than the 
Treasury) formerly had the sole ability to alter and adapt the economic 
substance doctrine.321  Now the courts’ ability to adapt the doctrine has been 
constricted in two ways: Section 7701(o) provides some specific rules, such 
as the ratio rule for taking profit potential into account,322 and it also allows 
the Treasury to issue guidance.   
How much restriction is actually placed on the courts’ ability to 
interpret the economic substance doctrine depends on how much precision 
(as opposed to room to maneuver) is contained in each of the substantive 
provisions of Section 7701(o) (discussed above), and also on whether the 
Treasury chooses to issue guidance and the content of that guidance.  
For example, “purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects),” 
“substantial,” and “meaningful” are all mandatory concepts and standards in 
the economic substance analysis under Section 7701(o).323  But the 
definitions of these standards are left to the courts, unless and until the 
Treasury issues guidance.  The statutory descriptions of the two prongs 
contain some detail, but not so much precision as to foreclose all judicial 
interpretation (at least until the Treasury weighs in with guidance).  
However, the Treasury can now have the last word on most economic 
substance topics if it wants to (by issuing guidance)—a change that has 
 
 319.  See Erik M. Jensen, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine, 28 J. TAX’N INV. 87, 
88 (2011) (noting that some commentators were concerned that codification restricted the potential for 
future adaptation); Bernard Wolfman, Why Economic Substance Is Better Left Uncodified, 104 TAX 
NOTES 445, 445 (2004) (discussing a previous codification proposal and the possibility that codification 
could prevent future adaptation of the doctrine). 
 320.  For example, when taxpayers began showing minimal (rather than zero) profit from challenged 
transactions, some courts clarified that de minimis or insignificant profit was not sufficient to meet the 
objective prong.  See, e.g., Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 767–68 (1990) (profit that was 
“infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered in comparison with the claimed 
deductions” was not sufficient); Knetsch v. U.S., 364 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1960) (expected profit that was 
“a relative pittance” was not enough); WFC Holdings Corp. v. U.S., 728 F.3d 736, 746 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(“modest profits” relative to “substantial tax benefits” were not enough, citation omitted); Salem Fin., 
Inc., 786 F.3d 932, 951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (profit “grossly disproportionate to the tax benefits” was 
not sufficient); Keeler v. C.I.R., 243 F.3d 1212, 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (possible profit from straddle 
transactions was “anemic beside considerable capacity for tax gaming”).  
 321.  See supra note 16. 
 322.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
 323.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (B), (2)(A). 
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occurred by reason of Section 7701(o).324   
How much flexibility is left to the courts, and how much regulatory 
authority is granted to the Treasury, varies depending on the sub-topic and 
the amount of detail that Section 7701(o) provides for each issue.  One issue 
that stands out as being specifically reserved to the courts is whether the 
economic substance doctrine applies at all (whether it is “relevant”), which 
is to be determined “as if this subsection had never been enacted.”325   
There is also the question of whether, when, and to what extent the 
Treasury will choose to exercise its regulatory authority on any topic under 
Section 7701(o).  At the moment, it appears to be in no hurry.326  The 
regulatory authority derived from Section 7701(o) constrains the courts’ 
interpretation of economic substance rules only on those topics on which 
guidance is actually issued. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Section 7701(o)’s codification of the economic substance doctrine 
presents a series of issues regarding the impact of the substantive provisions 
of the statute on the judicial doctrine, including unintended consequences.   
 
 324.  There have previously been disagreements about whether Treasury regulations could impose 
rules that contradict prior judicial decisions about the meaning of particular statutory provisions.  For 
example, multiple courts held that subsequent regulations could not have such an effect, in the “Mexican 
Railroad cases.”  See Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 839, 841 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 
1967), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 411 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1969); Missouri-Illinois 
R.R. Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1001, 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. 
v. United States, 455 F.2d 993, 1003 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973); 
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1386, 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1974); see generally Rev. Rul. 78-
256, 1978-1 C.B. 438 (1978); G.C.M. 37264 (1977).  In that situation, Congress enacted statutory 
language that essentially repeated the disputed regulatory rule, ending that particular conflict between the 
executive and judicial branches.  See I.R.C. § 901(i).  The situation regarding the economic substance 
doctrine is arguably different from the Mexican Railroad cases, because the Treasury would be 
interpreting a relatively new statute, section 7701(o), that has not yet been applied by the courts. 
 325.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 326.  See Andrew Velarde, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: ‘Wait-and-See’ Approach for More 
Economic Substance Guidance, 146 TAX NOTES 744, 2015 TNT 21-8 (Feb. 9, 2015).  One Treasury 
official indicated in public comments that further Section 7701(o) guidance might not be coming any 
time soon: 
“I think the position is more a wait and see to see how . . . it evolves, to see how cases evolve, 
to see how the notices and the directives end up working in implementation,” said Rochelle 
Hodes, attorney-adviser, Treasury Office of Tax Legislative Counsel [speaking at an 
American Bar Association meeting in 2015]. 
Id.  The IRS has issued, so far, two notices regarding section 7701(o), and two letters addressed to its 
own employees (regarding procedures for raising economic substance issues).  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-
62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411; I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746; LB&I Directive, supra note 20; 
LMSB Directive, supra note 20; see generally Rosenberg, Codification, supra note 109. 
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It is not clear that the statute’s choice of the conjunctive test (rather than 
other versions of the doctrine) is much of a change from the courts’ usual 
practice before codification.  Almost all circuits previously examined both 
objective and subjective factors, regardless of how they described the 
economic substance test.327  However, the statutory formulation might 
conceivably make a difference in the future for cases like Wells Fargo,328 
where the objective and subjective prongs may (unusually) yield different 
results. 
In contrast, Section 7701(o)’s (possibly inadvertent) implication that 
business purpose is a different analysis than the objective prong, but that the 
two prongs are of equal importance, changes the way the doctrine was 
applied before codification.  The subjective prong is thus likely to become 
more important than it was, compared to the usual economic substance 
approach before codification.  Formerly, the subjective prong almost never 
caused a transaction to fail the economic substance test, because the 
objective prong was often given more weight (as the doctrine was actually 
applied, even if not in its formal description).329  That priority treatment of 
the objective prong will have to change after Section 7701(o), although 
taxpayers and the IRS seem not to have focused on this statutory effect.  In 
addition, it is not clear yet what exactly taxpayers will be required to prove 
in order to show the required business purpose, now that business purpose 
arguably cannot be identical to the profit analysis that is usually the basis (in 
practice) for the objective prong. 
Section 7701(o) locks in “substantial” as the required minimum for 
business purpose and for the profit ratio test, without defining “substantial.”  
Similarly, “meaningful” change in “economic position” is now required in 
order to meet the objective prong, but the quoted terms are not defined in the 
statute.  These “meaningful” and “substantial” terms appear to require more 
from taxpayers than pre-Section-7701(o) case law.  Among other things, 
meaningful change may mean actual change, rather than reasonably 
expected change. 
Section 7701(o) also imposes a degree of consistency on the circuits, 
some of which might not have previously opined on every issue affected by 
Section 7701(o) (e.g., whether profit needs to reach a minimum size in 
relation to tax benefits, or whether economic change other than profit can 
 
 327.  See e.g., Casebeer, 909 F.2d at 1363–66; see also supra note 33; cf. also supra note 12.  
 328.  See Wells Fargo II, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1143, 1146 (D. MN 2017) (jury found that a loan 
met the objective prong but not the subjective prong, and the court held that such a result was sufficient 
to meet the economic substance test). 
 329.  See supra note 13. 
DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2018  10:28 AM 
Winter 2019              CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 125 
 
 
meet the objective prong).  However, codification does not mandate every 
aspect of the economic substance doctrine, but instead leaves room for 
judicial and administrative interpretation.  For example, undefined terms in 
Section 7701(o) remain open to various constructions by different circuits 
(at least until the Treasury issues guidance).  Therefore, the circuits may still 
lack complete uniformity in their application of the economic substance 
doctrine. 
In addition, codification does not technically prevent the courts or the 
Treasury (by guidance) from requiring more than the minimum standards set 
in the statute.  For example, Section 7701(o) does not appear to prevent the 
courts or Treasury guidance from examining more than just the two prongs 
(e.g., from examining additional factors), or requiring more profit than the 
ratio test describes, although the latter may be unlikely.330   
Section 7701(o) leaves a patchwork of substantive issues that courts can 
answer until the Treasury speaks, concepts on which the Treasury can issue 
guidance, and rules that are required by the Code.  This is a change from the 
status quo before Section 7701(o)’s effective date, when the economic 
substance doctrine’s content was determined entirely by the courts.  Before 
such effective date, the Treasury had no authority to issue guidance, but 
instead could only argue about interpretation of the doctrine as a litigant.331  
Thus, what is important about Section 7701(o) is not only what it mandates, 
but also how it alters the relative power of the courts and Treasury to adapt 
the economic substance doctrine in the future.   
Even if there has not been much substantive guidance on Section 
7701(o) so far, apart from two IRS notices,332 the provision has the potential 
to cause more change because the Treasury has the ability to issue additional 
substantive guidance about the economic substance doctrine in the future.  In 
addition, some requirements in the statute (e.g., the need for “substantial” 
business purpose) are mandatory and therefore may impact court 
interpretations of the economic substance doctrine even without IRS 
 
 330.  It is not clear that even technically preventing courts from requiring more than “substantial” 
business purpose or profit would hamper judicial interpretation much, because “substantial” is not 
defined—for either the business purpose prong or the profit ratio test.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(B), (2)(A).  
In addition, change in economic position must be “meaningful” (which also is not defined) even if the 
profit ratio test is met.  See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A).  The courts have the ability to define these statutory 
terms (unless until the Treasury issues guidance on such definitions). 
 331.  Before Section 7701(o) took effect, the Treasury Department, through the IRS, could decide 
when to raise economic substance arguments (i.e., in which fact patterns) on audit and in the Tax Court, 
but it could neither issue guidance that mandated a definition for various terms nor set rules regarding 
how the doctrine should be applied. 
 332.  See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411; I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746. 
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regulatory action. 
We can expect to see section 7701(o)’s impact in the future, as courts 
begin to interpret its effects on the economic substance doctrine and as the 
Treasury potentially issues binding guidance under the statute. 
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Appendix 
 
TEXT OF SECTION 7701(o): 
 
(o) Clarification of economic substance doctrine  
 
(1) Application of doctrine In the case of any transaction to which the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be 
treated as having economic substance only if—  
 
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal 
income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and 
 
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal 
income tax effects) for entering into such transaction. 
 
(2) Special rule where taxpayer relies on profit potential  
 
(A) In general The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken 
into account in determining whether the requirements of 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) are met with respect 
to the transaction only if the present value of the reasonably 
expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in 
relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that 
would be allowed if the transaction were respected. 
 
(B) Treatment of fees and foreign taxes Fees and other transaction 
expenses shall be taken into account as expenses in determining 
pre-tax profit under subparagraph (A). The Secretary shall issue 
regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in 
determining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases. 
 
(3) State and local tax benefits For purposes of paragraph (1), any State 
or local income tax effect which is related to a Federal income tax 
effect shall be treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax 
effect. 
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(4) Financial accounting benefits For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), 
achieving a financial accounting benefit shall not be taken into 
account as a purpose for entering into a transaction if the origin of 
such financial accounting benefit is a reduction of Federal income 
tax. 
 
(5) Definitions and special rules For purposes of this subsection—  
 
(A) Economic substance doctrine  The term “economic substance 
doctrine” means the common law doctrine under which tax 
benefits under subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not 
allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance 
or lacks a business purpose. 
 
(B) Exception for personal transactions of individuals  In the case 
of an individual, paragraph (1) shall apply only to transactions 
entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity 
engaged in for the production of income. 
 
(C) Determination of application of doctrine not affected  The 
determination of whether the economic substance doctrine is 
relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner as if 
this subsection had never been enacted. 
 
(D) Transaction  The term “transaction” includes a series of 
transactions. 
 
